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INTRODUCTION 
For seventy-five years, Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing1 has 
provided a one-line answer to choice-of-law questions in federal diversity 
cases: Erie Railroad v. Tompkins2 requires the federal court to employ the same 
law that a court of the state would select. The simplicity of the proposition 
likely accounts for the unqualified breadth with which federal courts now 
apply it. Choice of law doctrine is difficult, consensus in hard cases is elusive, 
and the anxiety that Erie produces over the demands of federalism tends to 
stifle any reexamination of core assumptions. The attraction of a simple 
answer is obvious. But Klaxon cannot bear the weight with which it has been 
loaded. 
Like Erie itself, Klaxon combines a core ruling on the limits of federal 
judicial power with a highly contextual statement of federal jurisdictional 
policy. Unlike Erie, however, Klaxon has not benefited from a long line of 
rulings mapping the boundaries of these respective principles. This doctrinal 
desuetude is no longer sustainable following the enactment of the Class 
Action Fairness Act (CAFA).3 CAFA effectuates a shift in the jurisdictional 
policy of the federal courts that requires a critical examination of the meaning 
and scope of Klaxon. And by moving increasing numbers of complex state-
law cases into federal proceedings that are then consolidated through the 
multi-district litigation process, CAFA has created increased pressure to 
undertake that reexamination. 
This Article offers a general approach to analyzing choice of law and 
jurisdictional policy in the federal courts. It begins by placing the spare 
language of Klaxon in analytical context and tracing the multiple lines of 
doctrine that intersect in the ruling. Those doctrines were undergoing a 
transformation at the time the Court issued its decision, yet the Klaxon Court 
confined its analysis narrowly, a fact that speaks to the limited scope of its 
holding. The Article then describes the relationship between federal 
jurisdictional policy and the elements of modern choice of law and maps the 
jurisdictional changes that Congress effectuated with CAFA and amplified 
with the MDL statute. Those changes represent a departure from the policies 
of the general diversity statute and render some of the core assumptions of 
the Erie doctrine inapposite. The central conclusion of this Article is that 
federal courts hearing complex cases under the jurisdiction of these 
specialized federal statutes have the power to develop independent federal 
 
1 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
2 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
3 Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2012)). 
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answers to one key component of the choice-of-law calculus: how to resolve 
conflicts between the laws of multiple interested states when each would 
apply its own law to a dispute. Whether federal courts should exercise that power 
as a matter of policy is a question that this Article leaves for future examination. 
What is clear, however, is that Klaxon does not hold sway in this class of cases. 
I. ERIE AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
A. The Shift in the Landscape that Surrounded Erie 
To appreciate the limited nature of Klaxon’s ruling, one must begin by 
reading the opinion against the analytical upheaval that was underway at the 
time it was written and compare the narrowness with which the Court spoke 
in Klaxon to the broad exploration of this shifting landscape that it undertook 
in contemporaneous rulings. When the Court rejected Swift v. Tyson, it set 
the stage for the creation of modern federal common law. That stage, in turn, 
provided the proscenium for a reframing of choice-of-law analysis that was 
already underway. 
The 1930s and 1940s were a transformative period in the relationship 
between state and federal courts. In a handful of years, the business of federal 
courts sitting in diversity underwent a complete reversal. The era of the 
Conformity Act4 and Swift v. Tyson,5 under which federal diversity courts 
would apply state law to most questions of procedure but general federal 
common law to many questions relating to liability, came to an end. In its 
place came the new dispensation of the Rules Enabling Act6 and the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which established the first uniform law of federal 
procedure for actions at law, and Erie, which eradicated the general federal 
common law and recognized state common-law courts as authoritative 
expositors of liability rules. 
At the same time, choice of law was poised for a revolution. In 1934 and 
1935, the work of Joseph Beale culminated, respectively, in the publication of 
the American Law Institute’s (ALI) First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 
which Beale drafted,7 and a treatise on the subject published under Beale’s 
own name.8 Both works sought to preserve and valorize a rule-based, 
territorial, vested-rights approach to choice-of-law analysis, but these holding 
actions quickly proved unsustainable. In 1942, Walter Wheeler Cook 
published The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, his magnificent 
 
4 Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255 § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (1872). 
5 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
6 Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934). 
7 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). 
8 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935). 
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account of legal method and purposive interpretation in conflicts analysis.9 
The work of Cook, his contemporary Ernest Lorenzen and successor David 
Cavers prefigured the more widely-credited work of Brainerd Currie, which 
would dramatically shift the paradigm of the field twenty years later10—a shift 
in paradigm that had in fact been quietly set in motion in the 1930s when the 
Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that bookended Beale’s work like 
harbingers, defining the constitutional limits on choice of law in terms of state 
interests and avoidance of unfair surprise.11 The Court’s iconic 1945 ruling in 
International Shoe v. Washington,12 effectuating a similar shift in the cognate 
field of personal jurisdiction that rejected the strict territorialism of 
Pennoyer v. Neff13 in favor of an approach based on state interests and 
fundamental fairness, came shortly thereafter. 
Developments in the field of federal jurisdiction were also underway. 
Between 1891 and 1925, Congress implemented a series of reforms that 
established the system of intermediate circuit courts of appeal with which we 
are familiar today, unifying the nisi prius work of the federal bench into 
district courts that would thereafter serve as the exclusive courts of original 
federal jurisdiction for most purposes while giving the circuit courts the last 
word in most cases and alleviating a decades-long crisis in the workload of 
the Supreme Court.14 In the 1920s, motivated in part by this sea change in 
the structure of the federal judicial system, leading thinkers like Felix 
Frankfurter and Charles Warren, and also a young Henry Friendly, produced 
scholarly treatments of the jurisdictional policies of the newly refashioned 
 
9 WALTER W. COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942). 
The book consisted of an edited collection of previously published essays along with several new 
additions. The most famous of the previously published works and the intellectual foundation for 
the project was an essay published in the Yale Law Journal for which the book became an eponym. 
Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924). As 
Professor Cavers wrote in a review of the book, Cook’s original essay was a “dramatic triumph over 
the ‘territorial’ and ‘vested rights’ theories” that “stormed his objectives by frontal assault.” 
David F. Cavers, Cook: The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 
1170-71 (1943) (book review). 
10 See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). 
11 See, e.g., Pac. Emp’rs Ins. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1939) 
(discussing the full faith and credit obligation of one state to give effect to the laws of another in 
terms of the interests of the respective states); Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 
294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935) (same); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1930) (imposing due 
process limitations on a choice of law that would impose unfair surprise upon a litigant). 
12 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
13 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
14 See Felix Frankfurter & James Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court of the United States—
A Study in the Federal Judicial System, 40 HARV. L. REV. 834, 834-42 & accompanying notes (1927) 
(laying out the series of statutory reforms by which the responsibilities and jurisdiction of the federal 
courts were updated). 
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federal courts that remain important resources to this day.15 Their work 
helped to lay the foundation for the understanding that the Court soon 
embraced in Guaranty Trust v. York that its Erie decision had articulated “a 
policy of federal jurisdiction,” as Justice Frankfurter would put it when given 
the opportunity to translate his scholarly work into an opinion for the 
Court.16 
That understanding of the Erie doctrine was bound up with a newly 
emerging account of the scope, content and function of federal common law. 
Following Erie, the Court had to reconsider the proper role of federal courts 
in crafting federal policy in the absence of express congressional direction. In 
the process, it had to determine what parts of its Swift-era jurisprudence 
would survive in the new order. Contemporaneous with that judicial inquiry, 
during the 1940s, Professors Hart and Wechsler undertook the monumental 
scholarly project that would culminate in the 1953 first edition of The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System,17 the casebook that defined Federal Courts as a 
coherent field of study distinct from Civil Procedure and worthy of separate 
attention and facilitated more expansive and sophisticated analysis of the 
distinctive purpose and function of the federal courts and federal jurisdiction. 
From this roiling sea emerged the Court’s 1941 decision in Klaxon. Short, 
simple, and containing little analysis, Klaxon held that a federal court hearing 
a case in its diversity jurisdiction was required to apply the same choice-of-
law rules that would have governed the case had it been brought in a court of 
the state in which it sits. Klaxon swept away over a hundred years of practice 
in which the Supreme Court and lower federal courts had issued independent 
choice-of-law rulings in common law cases. Like so much in the post-Erie 
years, Klaxon was a revolution. And, like so much in those years, it was merely 
an initial statement in a complex field that would require further elaboration. 
The Sections that follow begin that overdue exposition. 
B. The Changes that Erie Wrought 
The revolution that Erie brought about in the American legal system 
operated on multiple levels. Most conspicuously, the decision “overruled a 
particular way of looking at law,” as Justice Frankfurter put it, under which 
“federal courts [had] deemed themselves free to ascertain what Reason, and 
therefore Law, required wholly independent of authoritatively declared State 
 
15 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483 
(1928); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 
HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923). 
16 Guaranty Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945). 
17 HENRY M. HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953). 
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law,” even in cases where Congress was without power to frame federal rules 
of decision.18 In rejecting that view, the Court gave voice to principles of 
federalism and separation of powers that had a constitutional dimension. 
Soon thereafter, the Court defined the “policy of federal jurisdiction”19—“the 
twin aims of the Erie rule,”20 as the Court would later put it—that has served 
as the starting point for determining the applicable law in “procedural” 
disputes in federal diversity courts where judge-made law is the potential 
source of the federal rule. These matters are well known—they constitute the 
received wisdom of the Erie ruling. 
But Erie also had a dramatic institutional impact. The ruling transformed 
the business of the Supreme Court, altering the range of issues that it would 
have occasion to decide, the supervisory function that it would serve in 
relation to the lower federal courts, and the certiorari policy that it would 
follow under the new dispensation. It also required the Court to develop a 
new vocabulary for describing the proper role of the federal courts in 
promulgating rules of decision in the absence of express congressional 
direction. When the Court pronounced that “[t]here is no federal general 
common law,”21 it set itself the task of determining which of its Swift-era 
precedents would survive that pronouncement. 
A close analysis of the cases decided in the decade following Erie finds the 
Court adopting a conservative approach as it takes the full measure of its 
paradigm-shifting decision along all these dimensions. The Court acted 
quickly to realign its institutional relationship with the lower federal courts, 
updating its policies on certiorari and standards of review to reflect the new 
reality and, where necessary, exercising a heavy hand of supervision to adapt 
the lower federal courts to their new task. But the realignment of the 
doctrines of federal common law came more gradually. The Court permitted 
itself to be vague about the governing source of law in several early cases in 
which it was not yet ready to resolve questions of federal power but 
apparently believed that circumstances required it to grant certiorari and 
issue a federal answer. And when the Court did provide guidance about the 
power of the federal courts to issue controlling rules of decision in the absence 
of express federal authority, it did so slowly and in stages—reaffirming those 
lines of precedent that survived from the Swift era, preserving others under 
a federal common-law rubric, and speaking in a new way about the role of 
federal courts in resolving disputes involving competing assertions of state 
authority. 
 
18 Guaranty Tr., 326 U.S. at 101-02. 
19 Id. at 101. 
20 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
21 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
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The formalistic language of the Klaxon decision reflects little of this 
unfolding terrain. That fact in itself is revealing. When one understands more 
fully the set of doctrinal developments in which Klaxon was embedded and 
how those developments were being discussed in contemporaneous decisions, 
the sparseness of the opinion suggests the limited scope of the issues that the 
Court resolved. When combined with the questions of choice of law and 
jurisdictional policy that remained open in cases following Klaxon—either 
reserved expressly by the Court or explored in dictum—a picture emerges of 
a more dynamic field of play than has previously been acknowledged for 
choice of law in federal courts. 
1. Institutional and Analytical Transitions  
Following the Ruling in Erie 
Erie required the Court to address some immediate transitional issues. 
Cases already in progress before the lower federal courts that had begun under 
the rule of Swift had to be reconsidered. The Supreme Court’s own policies on 
granting certiorari and handling appeals had to be restructured. And there were 
threshold questions about how broadly the ruling in Erie would be applied and 
how federal courts would go about determining the content of state law. The 
Court took up many of these questions in the three years between Erie and 
Klaxon. At the same time, the Court itself had to learn a new analytical mode 
and a greater degree of precision in specifying the source of the common law 
principles that it was applying in commercial disputes, a precision that was 
surprisingly slow in coming in those transitional years. 
One week after Erie, the Court handed down its opinion in 
Ruhlin v. New York Life Insurance,22 a state-law dispute involving a request for 
rescission of several life insurance policies. Largely forgotten now, Ruhlin was 
one of the standard citations in the Court’s Erie jurisprudence for a number 
of years, for it was the case in which the Court first held that the rejection of 
the general federal common law applied in equity cases as well as actions at 
law.23 The Rules of Decision Act (RDA) applied only to “trials at common 
 
22 Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938). 
23 Id. at 205. Earlier decisions had also looked to state supreme court opinions on matters of 
contract interpretation, but as a matter of prudence rather than “power.” Ruhlin superseded those 
decisions and held that: 
The decision in [Erie] goes further, and settles the question of power. The 
subject is now to be governed, even in the absence of state statute, by the 
decisions of the appropriate state court. The doctrine applies though the 
question of construction arises not in an action at law, but in a suit in 
equity. 
Id. 
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law” until it was amended in 1948 to encompass all “civil actions,”24 but the 
Court offered no analysis for its conclusion that Erie controlled in such cases 
as well, perhaps taking it to be a self-evident result of the constitutional 
component of the ruling or perhaps desiring to avoid broad pronouncements 
or dense analysis at such an early point in the journey upon which it had 
embarked. That reticence was apparent in another aspect of the ruling as well: 
the dispute in Ruhlin presented a potential choice-of-law issue, but the Court 
expressly declined to decide it, a reservation that the Klaxon Court would 
make reference to three years later.25 
The Ruhlin decision also explained the change in the Court’s certiorari 
policy that the rejection of Swift occasioned, reflecting Erie’s immediate 
institutional consequences for the business of the Court. 
Had [Erie] been announced at some prior date the course of this case might 
have been different. This court might not have issued a writ of certiorari. 
Rule 38(5) of the Supreme Court Rules . . . indicates that this Court will 
consider, as a reason for granting a writ of certiorari, the fact that “a Circuit 
Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision of 
another Circuit Court of Appeals on the same matter . . . .” As to questions 
controlled by state law, however, conflict among circuits is not of itself a 
reason for granting a writ of certiorari. The conflict may be merely corollary 
to a permissible difference of opinion in the state courts.26 
It would take the Court several years to sort out the role it would play in 
reviewing decisions of lower federal courts on pure questions of state law, as 
I discuss below. 
In the two weeks after Ruhlin, the Court issued four GVR orders granting 
pending requests for certiorari on federal judgments that had been issued 
under the general common law of Swift, vacating the rulings and remanding 
 
24 See Act of Jun. 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 944 (1948), which amended the Rules of 
Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012), to substitute “civil actions” for “trials at common law” in 
describing the ambit of the statute. The change brought the language of the RDA into alignment 
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which merged law and equity and specified the “civil 
action” as the unit of civil litigation in the federal courts. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form 
of action—the civil action.”). 
25 See Ruhlin, 304 U.S. at 208 n.2 (“Under the general doctrine the interpretation of an 
insurance contract depends on the law of the place where the policy is delivered. We do not now 
determine which principle must be enforced if the Pennsylvania courts follow a different conflict of 
laws rule.” (citation omitted)); Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 494 (“The principal question in this case is 
whether in diversity cases the federal courts must follow conflict of laws rules prevailing in the states 
in which they sit. We left this open in [Ruhlin].”). 
26 Ruhlin, 304 U.S. at 205-06. Professor Hartnett notes the impact of Erie in his discussion of 
the Court’s discretionary certiorari practice following enactment of the Judges’ Bill of 1925. 
See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ 
Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1721 n.443 (2000). 
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for further consideration in light of Erie and Ruhlin.27 Those orders signaled 
to the lower federal courts that they should take it upon themselves to alter 
course in their pending cases, entertaining petitions for rehearing where 
necessary in light of the potential change in the governing rule of decision 
that Erie brought. Despite the magnitude of that change, this part of the 
transitional period appears to have been free of major crises, at least so far as 
the Court’s own caseload reveals. There are only a few cases during this time 
in which it appears that the Court had to employ its writ of certiorari to 
discipline resistant circuit courts.28 
A cluster of questions predictably arose early in the Court’s Erie cases 
involving the content of state law: the analytical question of how to determine 
that content, and the institutional question of how the Supreme Court would 
treat such determinations by lower federal courts. As to the first, the Court 
quickly held that, in the absence of controlling decisions by state supreme 
courts, the federal courts were bound to follow the decisions of intermediate 
state appellate courts.29 That ruling committed the Court to the proposition 
that state law principles have determinate content even in the absence of a 
 
27 See N.Y. Life Ins. v. Jackson, 304 U.S. 261, 262 (1938) (GVR order in action to cancel 
insurance policy on grounds of fraud); Rosenthal v. N.Y. Life Ins., 304 U.S. 263, 264 (1938) (same); 
Hudson v. Moonier, 304 U.S. 397, 397-98 (1938) (GVR order in negligence action for personal 
injuries); Mut. Benefit, Health & Accident Ass’n v. Bowman, 304 U.S. 549, 550 (1938) (GVR 
order for unspecified dispute). 
28 The most conspicuous example involved a case in the Fifth Circuit, where the Supreme 
Court began its opinion reversing that court by explaining, “We granted certiorari in this case to 
review a judgment in which the Circuit Court of Appeals applied a Mississippi statute of limitations 
contrary to the Mississippi Supreme Court’s application of the same statute to the same plea in the 
same case.” Moore v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630, 631 (1941) (citations omitted), overruled on other 
grounds, Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972). Moore happens to have been 
the Erie ruling that most closely preceded the Court’s decision in Klaxon. 
Another pointed example, also from the Fifth Circuit, came in the earlier case of 
Wichita Royalty Co. v. City National Bank of Wichita Falls. 306 U.S. 103 (1939). The Supreme 
Court reversed an attempt by the Court of Appeals in Wichita Royalty to depart from a Texas 
Supreme Court precedent that the Circuit had already rejected on general commercial law 
principles at an earlier (pre-Erie) stage of the case. Following Erie, the Fifth Circuit stuck to 
its guns, claiming that an intervening Texas Supreme Court decision had validated its position, 
but the Supreme Court was having none of it. See id. at 109 (“Even if we thought this 
distinction [upon which the Texas courts had relied] not well taken, nothing requires the state 
courts to adopt the rule which the federal or other courts may believe to be the better one. 
That the distinction [in the Texas case] was advisedly made and was not intended to modify 
the rule announced by the state court on the appeal in this case, appears from the opinions in 
both cases.”). 
29 The Court issued three rulings to this effect on the same day, the leading one of which 
was Fidelity Union Trust v. Field. 311 U.S. 169 (1940); see also West v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 311 U.S. 
223, 236-37 (1940) (applying the same ruling to a case in involving two successive suits between 
the same parties); Six Cos. of Cal. v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13 of Cal., 311 U.S. 180, 188 
(1940) (“We have fully discussed the principle involved in the cases of [West] and [Fidelity 
Union Trust], decided this day, and further amplification is unnecessary.”). 
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controlling decision by the highest state court, rejecting the assumption of 
several circuits that they remained free to interpret that content for 
themselves until the state supreme court weighed in.30 The Court also held 
that lower federal courts were bound by authoritative state court rulings even 
when those rulings were issued after judgment had been entered in a federal 
district court and the case was on appeal—a ruling that rejected Swift-era 
precedents that had relied on the vocabulary of vested rights in favor of a 
more positivist account of the effect that changes in the law have on a pending 
judicial proceeding.31 
The Court’s conclusions about its own role in determining the content of 
state law were less straightforward. Erie abruptly ended the Court’s status as 
the final expositor of general common law principles for the federal courts, 
and the Court vacillated for a few years in defining its new supervisory 
function. In several cases, the Court rejected circuit court rulings on the 
content of state law without reciting any obligation to give deference to those 
rulings, though it is clear that the Court believed the interpretations it was 
rejecting in those cases were strained.32 In others, the Court expressed 
reluctance to revisit the decisions of lower federal courts on questions of state 
law, though it did not specify how that reluctance would be given formal 
expression.33 By 1943, the Court appeared to have settled on a formal plain 
error standard, pronouncing in Palmer v. Hoffman that “[w]here the lower 
federal courts are applying local law, we will not set aside their ruling except 
on a plain showing of error.”34 But that pronouncement was short-lived. 
Palmer was not cited for this proposition in any subsequent Erie case and 
appears to have been relied on by the Court on only one occasion for this 
 
30 As the Court explained in Fidelity Union Trust: 
The highest state court is the final authority on state law, but it is still the duty of the 
federal courts, where the state law supplies the rule of decision, to ascertain and apply 
that law even though it has not been expounded by the highest court of the State. An 
intermediate state court in declaring and applying the state law is acting as an organ 
of the State and its determination, in the absence of more convincing evidence of what 
the state law is, should be followed by a federal court in deciding a state question . . . 
whether the question is one of statute or common law. 
311 U.S. at 177-78 (citations omitted). 
31 Vanderbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538, 540-42 (1941). 
32 See, e.g., Wichita Royalty, 306 U.S. at 109-10 (rejecting Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of 
intervening changes in Texas law). 
33 See, e.g., Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1940) (“The Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that under New York law the terms of the trust would not be changed ‘unless the wife can 
disaffirm it for fraud, overreaching, or the like.’ If the case was here on application of local law under 
the rule of [Erie], we would not be inclined to disturb that finding.” (citation omitted)). 
34 Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 118 (1943). 
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issue, in an unusual context and decades later.35 Following Palmer, the Court 
would spend several years expressing its reluctance to disturb the rulings of 
lower federal courts on matters of state law in terms of its certiorari policy36 
before eventually returning to a principle of deference to the lower federal 
courts, albeit in vaguer terms than the Court had first used in Palmer,37 
coupled with a de facto certiorari policy under which it is now exceedingly rare for 
the Court to review diversity rulings solely in order to correct errors in state law. 
During this same period, the Court’s own statements on the sources and 
content of the law it was applying were surprisingly non-specific in several 
key decisions. In the first case in which it acknowledged Erie in the term 
following the decision, the Court weighed in on a high-stakes trademark 
dispute between two manufacturers of breakfast cereal, Kellogg and Nabisco, 
over their competing shredded wheat products.38 In a footnote at the outset 
of the majority opinion, Justice Brandeis observed: 
The federal jurisdiction rests on diversity of citizenship—National Biscuit 
Company being a New Jersey corporation and Kellogg Company a Delaware 
corporation. Most of the issues in the case involve questions of common law 
and hence are within the scope of [Erie]. But no claim has been made that the 
local law is any different from the general law on the subject, and both parties 
have relied almost entirely on federal precedent.39 
 
35 The lone reference appears in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, in a 
portion of the opinion analyzing and upholding parts of a Pennsylvania law that restricted access to 
abortion procedures. 505 U.S. 833, 880 (1992). 
36 See, e.g., Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1944) (per curiam) (“The decision of 
the highest court of a state on matters of state law are in general conclusive upon us, and ordinarily 
we accept and therefore do not review, save in exceptional cases, the considered determination of 
questions of state law by the intermediate federal appellate courts…”). 
37 See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 482 (1988) (“Following our normal practice, ‘we 
defer to the construction of a state statute given it by the lower federal courts . . . to reflect our belief 
that district courts and courts of appeals are better schooled in and more able to interpret the laws 
of their respective States.’” (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 499-500 
(1985))). This deference is at its strongest when the lower federal courts agree on the construction 
of state law. See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 395 (1988) (“This Court rarely 
reviews a construction of state law agreed upon by the two lower federal courts.”). 
It should be noted that such deference to lower federal court pronouncements on state law 
exhibits a degree of tension with the Court’s 1991 ruling that federal appeals courts should review 
the rulings of district courts de novo on issues of state law, owing in part to the superior institutional 
capacity of appeals courts to consider difficult questions of law (and to some skepticism about the 
“local expertise” rationale for deference). See Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231-39 
(1991). It is perhaps in part for this reason that the Court has chosen to be vague in the nature of 
the deference that it shows, reserving to itself the prerogative to reject lower court interpretations 
of state law whenever it deems it appropriate to do so. 
38 Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938). 
39 Id. at 113 n.1. 
1858 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1847 
This is a remarkable finesse for the Court (and the jurist) that had just 
turned the world of common-law adjudication in the federal courts upside-
down. When the Court went on to define the duties that fall on bearers of 
potentially confusing trademarks—for example when it explained that “[t]he 
obligation resting upon Kellogg Company is not to insure that every 
purchaser will know it to be the maker [when consumers eat its shredded 
wheat] but to use every reasonable means to prevent confusion”—it 
demonstrated no concern for specifying the source of the law that it was 
making.40 Five years before its decision in Clearfield Trust,41 the Court was 
apparently not yet ready to identify its role in defining rights peripheral to a 
federal issue (in Kellogg, the federal trademark registration provisions),42 
leaving doubt as to which tribunals should consider themselves bound by the 
principles the Court was articulating. Indeed, in the years immediately 
following Kellogg, some lower federal courts sitting in diversity took the 
Court’s equivocation on the matter as an invitation to use Kellogg as something 
like a general federal common law precedent.43 Kellogg continues as a point of 
reference in jurisprudence under the Lanham Act44—subsequently enacted in 
194645—which now defines the rights and duties associated with trademark 
 
40 Id. at 121. In another representative passage, the Court speaks to the rights of manufacturers 
to enjoy the benefits of goodwill generated by their competitors. 
Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the article known as 
“Shredded Wheat”; and thus is sharing in a market which was created by the skill and 
judgment of plaintiff ’s predecessor and has been widely extended by vast expenditures 
in advertising presently made. But that is not unfair. Sharing in the goodwill of an 
article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all—
and in the free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested. 
Id. at 122. 
41 Clearfield Tr. Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
42 See Kellogg, 311 U.S. at 117 n.3 (“The trade-marks are registered under the [federal] Act of 
1920. But it is well settled that registration under it has no effect on the domestic common-law rights 
of the person whose trade-mark is registered.”) (citations omitted). 
43 See, e.g., Skinner Mfg. v. Gen. Foods Sales, 52 F. Supp. 432, 438-40 (D. Neb. 1943) 
(describing the difficulties of ascertaining Nebraska law on a trademark issue and the “absurdities” 
produced by attempting a choice-of-law analysis and relying upon Kellogg to conclude that “there is 
no disposition in this state to depart from the generally prevailing rule”). 
44 The case is cited in disputes under the Act involving advertising and trademark. See, e.g., 
Kenner Parker Toys v. Tyco Indus., No. 87 Civ. 1136(WK), 1987 WL 124319, at *4 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
20, 1987) (“Justice Brandeis’ opinion [in Kellogg] articulated the doctrines upon which the Lanham 
Act was based, and continues to be cited for the proposition it formulated.”). 
45 Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, 444 (1946) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2012)). 
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infringement as a matter of federal law.46 At the time it was issued, however, 
the decision left unspecified the source of law that it was applying. 
In another dispute, United States v. Bethlehem Steel,47 decided four years 
later (and still a year before Clearfield Trust), the Court again declined to state 
the sources of law on which it was relying in resolving a major commercial 
lawsuit, this one between the United States and a shipbuilding company 
relating to manufacturing services that the company rendered during World 
War I. The dispute sounded in contract, with the government claiming that 
Bethlehem had exercised duress and acted in bad faith during a time of 
exigent need and hence should be denied a portion of the profits for which it 
had bargained. In ruling against the government, the lower federal courts had 
applied state law, as they believed Erie required.48 Once again, the Court 
recognized that there was some question as to what law should govern a case 
involving rights peripheral to a federal issue (here, contracting with the U.S. 
government), and once again it declined to decide the issue. Pronouncing 
broadly on such core contract principles as consideration, unconscionability 
and duress, the Court claimed that it “need not decide” the source of law in 
the case because it thought the governing principles to be so well 
established.49 Those principles were not so clear to Justice Frankfurter, who 
dissented on the merits, but even Frankfurter shared in this remarkable lack 
of attention to the sources of the controlling law.50 Indeed, in the lower-court 
opinion in Clearfield Trust that the Supreme Court later affirmed, the Third 
Circuit indicated that the Court had “avoided” this important question in 
Bethlehem Steel.51 Bethlehem Steel, too, was cited for several decades, as a sort 
of general-law precedent for contract disputes.52 
 
46 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995) (citing Kellogg in 
discussion of the “functionality doctrine,” which “prevents trademark law . . . from . . . inhibiting 
legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature.”). 
47 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942). 
48 Id. at 299 n.9. 
49 Id. at 299-300; see also id. at 299 (“[W]e know of no federal or state statute or established 
rule of law in any jurisdiction inconsistent with the elementary proposition that a promise to build 
ships is good consideration for a promise to pay a sum of money whether fixed in amount or 
depending upon the relationship between actual and estimated cost.”). 
50 See, e.g., id. at 326 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“But is there any principle which is more 
familiar or more firmly embedded in the history of Anglo-American law than the basic doctrine that 
the courts will not permit themselves to be used as instruments of inequality and injustice?”); id. at 
326-31 (variously citing to Swift-era cases, state-law cases, and cases suggesting a federal common-
law rule of decision in discussing the concept of duress). 
51 United States v. Clearfield Tr., 130 F.2d 93, 95 n.6 (3d Cir. 1942), aff ’d, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). 
52 See, e.g., In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722, 727 n.9 (5th Cir. 1971) (in contract issue 
governed by Mississippi law, citing Bethlehem Steel along with Corbin on Contracts and various 
Mississippi authorities on the issue of consideration). 
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The failure of the Court to specify the exact source of the rule of decision 
in its cases, even on important issues, is not a failing unique to this 
transitional period. To note just one conspicuous and more recent example, 
the Court took sixty-three years following its ruling in Erie to explain the 
source and content of the preclusive effect that attaches to a judgment issued 
by a federal court sitting in diversity.53 Nonetheless, these two instances are 
telling. In both cases, the Court may have felt that institutional concerns 
impelled it to grant a writ of certiorari and resolve the disputes: 
Kellogg v. Nabisco raised questions about trademark, competition and product 
development that were pressing enough to lead Congress to enact national 
standards within a few years of the Court’s decision, and Bethlehem Steel 
involved a major wartime contract dispute with the United States as the 
complaining party. At the same time, it is apparent that the Court was not 
yet ready to write broadly about the role that preemptive federal common law 
would play in cases where federal issues were closely mingled with rights 
traditionally defined by common-law doctrine. And so the Court spoke 
broadly about trademark infringement and the contractual rights and 
obligations of the U.S. government without requiring of itself the same 
discipline that it was demanding of lower federal courts in speaking carefully 
about sources of law. 
2. Federal Common Law 
Despite the ambiguity of decisions like Kellogg and Bethlehem Steel, the 
Court did begin to provide guidance on the status and content of federal 
common law—a term that encompasses a broader array of issues than is 
commonly appreciated. Contemporary discussions of federal common law 
focus the bulk of their attention on the limited class of cases involving federal 
liability or regulatory rules that displace contrary state law in both state and 
federal proceedings and are developed by courts to give voice to “uniquely 
federal interests”54 or as extensions or interstitial interpretations of federal 
statutes. The Court itself sometimes uses the term “federal common law” 
coextensively with this subset of cases.55 It is an impoverished vocabulary that 
threatens to obscure the full range of issues that the Court was forced to 
rethink upon issuing the Erie decision. The judicially crafted doctrines that 
 
53 See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001) (holding that the 
preclusive effect of a judgment issued by a federal diversity court is governed by federal common 
law but that the applicable state preclusion law should ordinarily be incorporated by reference 
barring some strong federal interest calling for a different or distinctly federal rule). 
54 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988). 
55 Id. (referring to such preemptive, judicially crafted federal rules of decision as “so-called 
‘federal common law’”). 
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govern the internal administration of remedies and procedure in the federal 
courts—equity practice, for example, or forum non conveniens—are also the 
product of federal common law, as are doctrines that provide for the 
resolution of competing claims of authority between states.56 Disputes 
presenting all three types of problem were a vibrant part of the Court’s docket 
in the decade following Erie, the latter two even more so than the type of 
preemptive liability and regulatory rules that the Court authorized in 
Clearfield Trust (and failed to address in Bethlehem Steel). 
The Court cautiously approached the task of sorting through this cluster 
of issues during the early years after Klaxon, as seen in 
D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,57 in which the Court again ducked the 
federal common law question that it had avoided in Bethlehem Steel along with 
a host of related questions concerning choice of law and jurisdictional policy 
in the federal courts. The case involved a bank note that the FDIC sought to 
enforce in the face of a defense that the note, as originally issued, was never 
meant to be called for payment. Decision of the case seemingly required the 
Court to specify the source of law that would govern that putative defense, 
which in turn implicated arguments about federal common law and choice of 
law in a non-diversity case (because both Missouri and Illinois law were 
potentially applicable, if state law controlled). The Court was unanimous in 
rejecting the defense, but only Justice Jackson was prepared to be explicit in 
specifying the analytical underpinnings of that result, chastising his 
colleagues for their failure to do so. 
I think we should attempt a more explicit answer to the question whether 
federal or state law governs our decision in this sort of case than is found 
either in the opinion of the Court or in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice 
FRANKFURTER. That question, as old as the federal judiciary, is met 
inescapably at the threshold of this case. It is the one which moved us to grant 
certiorari, and we could not resort to the rule announced without at least a 
tacit answer to it.58 
 
56 Federal common law can also operate to carry into effect the procedural policies embodied 
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their appellate counterparts through procedural field 
preemption, even when the text of such provisions do not expressly prescribe that result—a mode 
of analysis that has been underappreciated and imperfectly rendered in the case law and scholarship 
in this area. Properly understood, the Supreme Court’s decision in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. 
Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987), in which the Court concluded that a federal diversity court should follow 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 37 and 38 rather than contrary state law when determining 
what penalties should accompany an unsuccessful appeal, falls into this category. See Stephen B. 
Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 17, 25-52 (2010). 
57 D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942). 
58 Id. at 465 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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The Court would wait another year before providing guidance on 
preemptive federal common law doctrine in Clearfield Trust, and its 
statements on choice of law and jurisdictional policy would come more 
sporadically. 
This subsection will sketch the landscape of federal common law during 
this transitional period in three stages. It begins with brief accounts of the 
emergence of federal common law rulings in the internal administration of 
the federal courts and in the articulation of preemptive liability and 
regulatory rules. It then examines the array of cases in which the Court 
discussed the role of the federal courts in framing rules of decision in cases 
involving competing or overlapping claims of state authority, including a 
surprisingly rich discussion of the issue in cases like D’Oench, Duhme in which 
choice-of-laws problems arose in a non-diversity context. Although the 
Supreme Court never issued a ruling expressly carving such cases out of the 
ambit of the Klaxon doctrine, it indicated its appreciation of the distinct 
doctrinal and jurisprudential forces that might properly govern such a 
dispute. 
a. Internal Administration of Federal Court Proceedings 
The power of federal courts to develop judge-made law for the internal 
administration of federal court proceedings, and the circumstances in which 
those rules of decision must bow to contrary state practice, has become largely 
synonymous with the “Erie doctrine” in modern parlance. The issue was 
addressed relatively late in the transitional period following Erie and, to an 
extent usually forgotten in contemporary discussions, was enmeshed with 
other questions of federal power that the Court was still sorting through. The 
decision in which the Court first spoke meaningfully to the issue, the 1945 
ruling in Guaranty Trust v. York,59 is often reduced to a tag line—the “outcome 
determination” test—and understood in light of the over-simplified account 
that the Court gave of the case in Hanna v. Plumer.60 In fact, the decision is 
both nuanced and deft. Justice Frankfurter navigated the Court through a 
cluster of problems in Guaranty Trust that had been producing confusion and 
conflicting rulings for the seven years that preceded it. 
Guaranty Trust involved a representative proceeding, brought in equity 
under New York law, asserting a breach of fiduciary duty by the defendant 
financial institution in its dealings with the holders of certain notes. The issue 
on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari concerned the timeliness of 
the suit. The defendant claimed that the suit was barred under the New York 
 
59 Guaranty Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
60 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965). 
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statute of limitations. Plaintiff argued, and the Second Circuit agreed, that a 
federal court sitting in equity was authorized to apply its own doctrine of 
laches to permit a suit that would be untimely under the statute so long as the 
defendant would suffer no prejudice from the delay. The Court held that the 
state statute of limitations was controlling. 
Prior to the Court’s ruling, the proper treatment of equitable remedies in 
a post-Erie federal proceeding was an unsettled matter. As noted above, the 
Court had proclaimed just a few weeks after Erie that its rejection of the 
general common law applied with equal force in cases brought in equity, 
despite the language still present in the Rules of Decision Act at that time 
that limited the statute to trials at common law.61 It was clear that federal 
equity courts sitting in diversity had to look to state decisional law for 
controlling liability rules. Two years later, however, the Court rejected the 
application of a state statute of limitations in a federal question case, using 
language that seemed to preserve a broad role for federal equity powers. The 
case, Russell v. Todd,62 involved an equitable class proceeding brought under 
the Federal Farm Loan Act that sought distribution of an insolvent fund 
among shareholders. The federal statute had no statute of limitations 
provision, requiring the Court to decide what standard should control 
questions of timeliness. The defendants claimed the action was barred by the 
statute of limitations of the state where suit was brought. The Court rejected 
that argument, instead applying a federal laches standard to find the claim 
timely. In describing the scope of a federal court’s remedial equitable powers, 
the Court emphasized that “[t]he Rules of Decision Act does not apply to 
suits in equity”—a seeming retrenchment from its broad pronouncement in 
Ruhlin on questions of equitable remedies—and so “the question decisive of 
this case is what lapse of time will bar recovery in the absence of an applicable 
federal statute of limitations.”63 The Court then looked to Swift-era 
precedents for a federal answer. It noted the continuing vitality of a line of 
cases under which federal equity courts had sometimes incorporated state 
statutes of limitations by reference for certain types of equitable disputes but 
concluded that those cases were not applicable and instead applied an 
independent laches standard. Acknowledging Erie at the close of its analysis, 
the Russell Court said that it had “no occasion to consider the extent to which 
federal courts, in the exercise of the authority conferred upon them by 
Congress to administer equitable remedies, are bound to follow state statutes 
and decisions affecting those remedies.”64 The pair of cases led Justice Jackson 
 
61 See Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 205-06 (1938). 
62 Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280 (1940). 
63 Id. at 287. 
64 Id. at 294. 
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to note two years later that the effect of Erie on disputes falling outside 
ordinary diversity jurisdiction “seems not to have been definitely settled,”65 
and Justice Frankfurter began his 1945 opinion by noting the issue that Russell 
had left open.66 
In Guaranty Trust, the Court had to disaggregate the questions of equity 
practice, jurisdiction and federal power that it had finessed in Russell. Because 
the Conformity Act and its predecessor did not apply to suits in equity, the 
federal courts had been developing their own “forms and modes of 
proceeding”67 in equity suits, including remedial doctrines, throughout their 
institutional history.68 At the same time, the distinction between concepts of 
“remedy” and “liability rule” was not always carefully policed in equity 
practice, particularly under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, where the federal 
courts were often free to craft equitable remedies and define rights and 
obligations without distinguishing carefully between the two.69 When 
Russell v. Todd strongly reaffirmed the power of federal courts to craft 
equitable remedies without regard to the Rules of Decision Act, it created 
uncertainty about the freedom that federal diversity courts might also retain to rely 
on quasi-substantive equitable doctrines to displace state rules of decision. 
In a portion of his opinion in Guaranty Trust that is often forgotten in 
contemporary discussions, Justice Frankfurter clarified the status of federal 
equity practice following Erie: 
 
65 D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 467 n.3 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
66 See Guaranty Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 100 (1945). 
67 Conformity Act of 1872, §5, 17 Stat. 197 (1872). 
68 The power to craft equitable doctrines and remedies traces back to the second Congress, 
which enacted legislation authorizing the federal courts to employ traditional equitable doctrines 
and craft such new doctrines (either by decision or through rules promulgated by the Supreme 
Court) as they deemed expedient. Here is the relevant text: 
And be it further enacted, That the forms of writs, executions and other process . . . shall 
be the same as are now used in . . . [courts] of equity and in those of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction, according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to 
courts of equity and to courts of admiralty respectively . . . . 
An Act for Regulating Processes in the Courts of the United States, and Providing Compensations 
for the Officers of the Said Courts, and for Jurors and Witnesses, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (1792) 
(emphasis in original). 
69 As Justice Frankfurter notes, however, 
it may fairly be said that the federal courts gave greater respect to State-created 
‘substantive rights’ in equity than they gave them on the law side, because rights at 
law were usually declared by State courts and as such increasingly flouted by extension 
of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, while rights in equity were frequently defined by 
legislative enactment and as such known and respected by the federal courts. 
Guaranty Tr., 326 U.S. at 104 (citation omitted). 
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From the beginning, there has been a good deal of talk in the cases that federal 
equity is a separate legal system. And so it is, properly understood. The suits 
in equity of which the federal courts have had cognizance ever since 1789 
constituted the body of law which had been transplanted to this country from 
the English Court of Chancery. But this system of equity derived its doctrines, 
as well as its powers, from its mode of giving relief. In giving federal courts 
cognizance of equity suits in cases of diversity jurisdiction, Congress never 
gave, nor did the federal courts ever claim, the power to deny substantive rights 
created by State law or to create substantive rights denied by State law.70 
To be fully descriptively accurate, Frankfurter might have written, “nor 
did the federal courts ever properly claim” such a power, since many federal 
courts (including the Second Circuit in Guaranty Trust itself) often made 
broad assumptions about the substantive prerogatives that equity afforded 
them. Nonetheless, with this passage and the analysis that surrounded it, the 
Court confirmed the continuing ability of federal diversity courts to develop 
and apply equitable doctrines in diversity cases so long as they gave effect to 
the parties’ rights and obligations as defined by state law.71 
In the better-known portions of his opinion, Justice Frankfurter then 
explained that the relevant line between “right” and “remedy” would be 
defined with reference to the jurisdictional policy that the Court had 
embraced for diversity cases in Erie. “Equitable relief in a federal court is of 
course subject to restrictions,” Frankfurter wrote, and the fact that “a State 
may authorize its courts to give equitable relief unhampered by any or all such 
restrictions cannot remove these fetters from the federal courts.”72 Rather, it 
is those differences in remedial practice that would “substantially affect the 
enforcement of the right as given by the State” that call for the application of 
state law, because “[t]he nub of the policy that underlies [Erie] is that for the 
same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in federal 
 
70 Id. at 105 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
71 The Court’s desire to maintain the consistency and stability of its equity precedents can be 
seen in the closing passage of the majority opinion: 
Dicta may be cited characterizing equity as an independent body of law. To the extent 
that we have indicated, it is. But insofar as these general observations go beyond that, 
they merely reflect notions that have been replaced by a sharper analysis of what 
federal courts do when they enforce rights that have no federal origin. And so, before 
the true source of law that is applied by the federal courts under diversity jurisdiction 
was fully explored, some things were said that would not now be said. But nothing 
that was decided . . . needs to be rejected. 
Id. at 112. 
72 Id. at 105-06. 
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court instead of in a state court a block away, should not lead to a substantially 
different result.”73 
Nothing like this analysis had appeared in the Court’s cases in such a fully 
realized form in the seven years leading up to Guaranty Trust. In several 
rulings (including Klaxon, as I discuss below), the Court had defined certain 
doctrines as “substantive” by way of holding that they fell within the ambit 
of Erie.74 In another case, the Court indicated (without further analysis) that 
state law must control “as to both substantive and procedural rights of the 
parties . . . where, as in this case, it controls decision.”75 And in two cases, 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. and Palmer v. Hoffman, the Court had begun to define 
the capacity of the newly authorized Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to 
displace contrary state law—expansively and with wooden formalism in 
Sibbach;76 with more nuance and moderation in Hoffman.77 But Guaranty Trust 
was the first occasion on which the Court provided an analytical framework 
that would support the promulgation of judicially crafted doctrines for the 
internal administration of federal court proceedings while also identifying 
those circumstances when the Erie doctrine might require such federal 
doctrines to bow to state law. 
Given the significance of that innovation, it is perhaps not surprising that 
the Court was slow to provide further refinement. Soon after Guaranty Trust, 
the Court issued a pair of rulings, both involving cases filed in New York, in 
which it translated another judicially crafted doctrine for the administration 
of federal proceedings past the Swift–Erie divide: forum non conveniens.78 The 
second ruling, Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, has proven durable and remains a standard 
point of reference in federal forum non cases.79 The Court’s ruling in 
 
73 Id. at 108-09. 
74 See, e.g., Cities Servs. Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212 (1939) (“We cannot accept the view 
that the [burden of proof in action for ownership of land] was only one of practice in courts of 
equity. Rather we think it relates to a substantial right upon which the holder of recorded legal title 
to Texas land may confidently rely.”). 
75 See Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 236 (1944) (per curiam) (requiring adherence to 
state law in determining whether a mandatory tax levy may be imposed to satisfy defaulted bonds). 
76 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (“The test must be whether a rule really 
regulates procedure—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive 
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”). 
77 See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943) (“Rule 8(c) covers only the manner of 
pleading. The question of the burden of establishing contributory negligence is a question of local 
law which federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases must apply.”) (citations omitted). 
78 See Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 512 (1947) (holding that “the District Court did not 
exceed its powers or the bounds of its discretion in dismissing plaintiff ’s complaint and remitting 
him to the courts of his own community.”); Williams v. Green Bay & W.R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 559-
60 (1946) (holding that “it was improper to dismiss the case on the grounds of forum non conveniens”). 
79 With the enactment of the federal venue transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012), the federal 
forum non doctrine has come to apply almost exclusively in international cases where the alternative 
forum would be a non-U.S. court; inconvenient domestic cases are handled through venue transfer. 
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Guaranty Trust helped confirm the power to develop an independent federal 
standard for forum non. But the Court ducked the Erie question in both cases, 
declining to decide whether the jurisdictional policy of federal diversity 
might require application of state forum non standards in some instances (a 
question that the Supreme Court has still not addressed). In the earlier ruling, 
Williams v. Green Bay & W.R. Co., the Court noted a Second Circuit decision 
holding that Erie required federal diversity courts “to apply the local rule of 
forum non conveniens,” but it “reserve[d] decision on that question” because, 
it said, New York forum non doctrine would produce the same result in that 
case.80 The following year, Gulf Oil found the lower courts still struggling with 
these questions, with the district court holding that local law controlled the 
forum non analysis and the Second Circuit rejecting that argument and 
applying a federal standard that adopted a restrictive reading of Williams and 
a narrow rule.81 The Supreme Court used Gulf Oil to provide more guidance 
on the content of the federal forum non standard, but it once again declined 
to say what would happen if state and federal standards diverged, issuing a 
caveat similar to the one in Williams.82 
In short, it took seven years for the Court to settle on an approach to the 
promulgation of federal common law doctrines geared toward the internal 
administration of federal court proceedings (and applicable only in those 
courts). Slowly and with uneven results, the Court separated out the elements 
of Erie that sounded in federalism and the limits of federal power from those 
that flowed from the jurisdictional policy of the general diversity statute. 
Even thereafter, it applied this new approach with caution. Ten years out, the 
Court was prepared to reaffirm the doctrine of forum non conveniens as a 
 
Nonetheless, the Court continues to rely upon Gulf Oil. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 
235, 255-61 (1981) (embracing Gulf Oil and applying its treatment of public and private interest 
factors to uphold a district court’s entry of dismissal in an international dispute). 
80 Williams, 326 U.S. at 558-59. 
81 See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 503; Gilbert v. Gulf Oil, 153 F.2d 883, 884-85 (2d Cir. 1946), rev’d, 
Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). 
82 As the Court stated in Gulf Oil: 
The law of New York as to the discretion of a court to apply the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens, and as to the standards that guide discretion is, so far as here involved, the 
same as the federal rule. It would not be profitable, therefore, to pursue inquiry as to 
the source from which our rule must flow. 
330 U.S. at 509 (citations omitted). 
It bears remarking, once again, the surprising analytical recklessness in this way of proceeding. 
See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s willingness to pronounce rules 
of decision in major cases without specifying the source of law). If federal diversity courts were in 
fact bound by local standards of forum non conveniens, then the Gulf Oil Court could simply have 
vacated the Second Circuit’s decision and remanded with instructions to review, for abuse of 
discretion, the district court’s assessment of the New York doctrine. 
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matter of federal power, but unready to explain how the doctrine should be 
measured against the jurisdictional policies that govern a diversity case. 
b. Preemptive Liability and Regulatory Rules 
The doctrine most commonly associated with the term “federal common 
law”—judicially crafted liability and regulatory rules that uniformly displace 
contrary state law, regardless of forum—developed unevenly in the 
transitional years. As discussed above, the Court exhibited caution in 
developing rules aimed at enforcing important federal interests, leading to 
analytically unsatisfying decisions like Bethlehem Steel, before it embraced the 
doctrine squarely in Clearfield Trust. At the same time, the Court was more 
confident in promulgating interstitial rules in cases that were governed by a 
federal statute but as to which “Congress ha[d] not specifically provided for 
the present contingency,” leaving certain “details to judicial implication.”83 
And the Court showed nuance in defining the relationship between federal 
law and state standards. In a variety of contexts, the Court found that federal 
law provided the rule of decision but would incorporate state law by reference 
when federal interests did not demand an independent standard. 
The Court’s quick reaffirmation of the power to develop interstitial 
rules—rules of decision in cases governed by federal statute but involving 
circumstances not specifically contemplated by the statutory text84—is not 
surprising, as it is perhaps the least adventuresome type of preemptive federal 
common law. Even so, Erie’s tectonic shift was great enough to leave even this 
question in doubt before the Court weighed in. In Deitrick v. Greaney, the 
Court heard an appeal involving a promissory note held by a national bank in 
receivership. The enforceability of the note was uncertain under a federal 
statute, the National Bank Act.85 The Court read the statute expansively “in 
the light of its purposes and policy”86 to empower the bank’s receiver to secure 
payment on the note. Counsel on both sides of the dispute had assumed that 
Erie might require them to measure the legality of the note under state law 
standards, since the matter was not explicitly dealt with under the Bank Act. 
The Court rejected that assumption, explaining: “[t]he extent and nature of 
the legal consequences of this condemnation, though left by the statute to 
judicial determination, are nevertheless to be derived from it and the federal 
 
83 Bd. of Comm’rs of Jackson Cty. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1939) (applying 
federal common law as an extension of a treaty in order to permit an award of interest on wrongfully 
collected taxes, an outcome that applicable state law would have prohibited). 
84 The use of the term “interstitial” in this setting appears to have been coined by Justice 
Holmes. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (“I recognize . . . that judges do and must 
legislate, but they can do so only interstitially.”). 
85 See Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 191-93 (1940). 
86 Id. at 198. 
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policy which it has adopted . . . .”87 The Court would go on to reiterate the 
proper role of the federal courts in articulating interstitial federal common 
law in several subsequent cases. One of its strongest statements comes in 
Sola Electric v. Jefferson Electric,88 a dispute involving the ability of a patent 
licensee to challenge a price-fixing clause that lay at the intersection of the 
federal patent laws and the Sherman Antitrust Act. In explaining the federal 
character of the question, the Court wrote: 
It is familiar doctrine that the prohibition of a federal statute may not be set 
at naught, or its benefits denied, by state statutes or state common law rules. 
In such a case our decision is not controlled by [Erie]. There we followed state 
law because it was the law to be applied in the federal courts. But the doctrine 
of that case is inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision within which the 
policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal 
relations which they affect must be deemed governed by federal law having 
its source in those statutes, rather than by local law. When a federal statute 
condemns an act as unlawful, the extent and nature of the legal consequences 
of the condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial determination, are 
nevertheless federal questions, the answers to which are to be derived from 
the statute and the federal policy which it has adopted. To the federal statute 
and policy, conflicting state law and policy must yield.89 
Even as it confirmed the post-Erie power of the federal courts to develop 
preemptive rules of federal common law, the Court also went out of its way 
to inflect that power with the federalism principles to which Erie had given 
voice. Consider Board of Commissioners of Jackson County v. United States.90 
Jackson County presented the question whether a Native American was 
entitled to interest on taxes that a state had collected from her in violation of 
a federal treaty. Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter rejected the Kansas 
law that would have forbidden such interest on taxes and found that a federal 
rule of decision was necessary to give proper effect to the treaty. He went on 
to hold, however, that such interest was equitable in nature—available only 
when fairness demanded, not compensation as of right—and that an award of 
interest was not warranted in this case.91 There was thus no need for the Court 
to specify the interest rate that would apply. Nonetheless, the Court reached 
 
87 Id. at 200-01 (citation omitted); see also id. at 200 (“A point much discussed in brief and 
argument, upon the assumption that local law will guide our decision is whether, by Massachusetts 
law, respondent is precluded from setting up the illegality of the transaction as a defense to his note.” 
(citation omitted)). 
88 Sola Elec. v. Jefferson Elec., 317 U.S. 173 (1942). 
89 Id. at 176 (citations omitted). 
90 Bd. of Comm’rs of Jackson Cty. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939). 
91 Id. at 349-50, 352-53. 
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out to decide the issue, finding in an extended discussion that federal law 
should adhere to state standards in such a case unless strong federal policies 
required otherwise: 
Having left the matter at large for judicial determination within the 
framework of familiar remedies equitable in their nature, Congress has left 
us free to take into account appropriate considerations of “public 
convenience.” . . . With reference to other federal rights, the state law has 
been absorbed, as it were, as the governing federal rule not because state law 
was the source of the right but because recognition of state interests was not 
deemed inconsistent with federal policy [citing Swift-era cases]. In the 
absence of explicit legislative policy cutting across state interests, we draw 
upon a general principle that the beneficiaries of federal rights are not to 
have a privileged position over other aggrieved tax-payers in their relation 
with the states or their political subdivisions.92 
This was Justice Frankfurter’s first statement on the interplay between 
federal and state policy following his appointment to the Court, and it 
prefigured the approach that he would adopt in Guaranty Trust six years later. 
Indeed, the Court’s decision the following year in Clearfield Trust operated in 
dialogue with rulings like Jackson County. In articulating the need for a 
uniform federal rule to govern transactions involving commercial paper 
issued by the U.S. government, Clearfield Trust rejected the proposal to 
“absorb” state law as a governing federal standard and looked to its  own 
Swif t-era precedents for a  dist inctive ly federal  standard.93 
Still, the Court’s account of its role in promulgating preemptive federal 
common law during this period often had a more formalistic quality. In the 
1942 case of Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co.,94 one of the first “reverse-Erie” 
rulings, the Court heard an appeal from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 
a case involving the federal Jones Act. The Pennsylvania court had applied 
state law on a burden-of-proof question, which it viewed as a “procedural” 
 
92 Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted). 
93 As the Court explained: 
In our choice of the applicable federal rule we have occasionally selected state law. But 
reasons which may make state law at times the appropriate federal rule are singularly 
inappropriate here . . . . The application of state law, even without the conflict of laws 
rules of the forum, would subject the rights and duties of the United States to 
exceptional uncertainty . . . . The desirability of a uniform rule is plain. And while the 
federal law merchant, developed for about a century under the regime of [Swift], 
represented general commercial law rather than a choice of a federal rule designed to 
protect a federal right, it nevertheless stands as a convenient source of reference for 
fashioning federal rules applicable to these federal questions. 
318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (citation omitted). 
94 317 U.S. 239 (1942). 
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matter, finding that the burden rested on the plaintiff to disprove the validity 
of a release he had executed that would prevent recovery even though the 
rules of federal admiralty practice would place the burden on the defendant 
to sustain the release. The Supreme Court explained that “the obligation on 
law courts . . . to enforce substantive rights arising from admiralty law” 
generally included an obligation “to do so in a manner conforming to 
admiralty practice” and found this requirement to be binding on state courts 
as a matter of federal law.95 In asking whether the burden-of-proof issue came 
under this principle, the Court began its analysis with a statement about the 
capacity of rules of practice “substantially to alter the rights . . . established 
in federal law,” a formulation that prefigured Guaranty Trust to a small extent, 
but it then rested its holding on the formalistic substance–procedure 
dichotomy that the Guaranty Trust Court would later reject.96 
3. Competing or Overlapping Claims of Interested States 
Some of the most intriguing early statements by the Court on federal 
common law are to be found in cases that involved competing or overlapping 
claims of interested states. About a half dozen of the Court’s cases fit this 
description in the decade following Erie, though only one—Hinderlider—
spoke to the issue as part of its square holding.97 
The dispute in Hinderlider involved competing claims between Colorado 
and New Mexico over the flow of water from the La Plata River. The river 
originates in Colorado, flows into New Mexico, and serves as an important 
source of irrigation water for both states. In 1925, Congress gave its consent 
to an interstate compact between the two states that provided a formula by 
which the waters would be apportioned when supply ran short. Supply ran 
short in 1928 and the Colorado official responsible for administering the 
Compact diverted the river’s water away from the facilities owned by the 
 
95 Id. at 243-44. 
96 That formalism is captured in the closing paragraphs of the opinion: 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has concluded that in solving problems of 
procedural, as distinguished from substantive, law, the law court may apply its own 
doctrine; and that the locus of burden of proof presents a procedural rather than a 
substantive question. 
Much of what we have said above concerning the necessity of preserving all of 
the substantial admiralty rights in an action at law is incompatible with the conclusion 
of the court below. The right of the petitioner to be free from the burden of proof 
imposed by the Pennsylvania local rule inhered in his cause of action. Deeply rooted 
in admiralty as that right is, it was a part of the very substance of his claim and cannot 
be considered a mere incident of a form of procedure. 
Id. at 248-49. 
97 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). 
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La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Company so that it would be available 
to New Mexico users downstream. The Ditch Company sued, claiming that 
its rights to water from the river should be measured with reference to 
Colorado law—specifically, with reference to an 1898 state court judgment 
that had applied Colorado law and purported to establish the rights of all 
claimants, awarding the Ditch Company a right to water access that the 
Compact was now interrupting. The Ditch Company claimed that the 
Compact was unconstitutional (and hence could be ignored), either because 
such compacts could never bind private citizens or because this particular 
Compact deprived the Ditch Company of its vested rights under the earlier 
judgment without due process or proper compensation.98 
Prior to Hinderlider, a long line of cases had established a doctrine of 
“equitable apportionment” under which the claims of competing states to the 
flow of a river had to be resolved with due regard to the interests of each. In 
such cases, the Court had held, adventitious circumstances that might place 
one state in a position of advantage—such as the greater power of the 
upstream state to exercise physical dominion over the flow waters of the 
river—could not be permitted to govern the outcome. “The river throughout 
its course in both States is but a single stream wherein each State has an 
interest which should be respected by the other.”99 The greater ability of one 
state to exercise physical power over the water could not be decisive under 
this doctrine, since “[b]oth States have real and substantial interests in the 
River that must be reconciled as best they may.”100 
A significant part of the Court’s holding in Hinderlider involved a 
reaffirmation of this equitable apportionment doctrine in the new world of 
Erie, which the Court handed down on the same day. The Court rejected the 
Ditch Company’s argument about its vested rights in the judgment, even 
though it was willing to assume that the company had acquired a cognizable 
property right in the earlier state proceeding,101 explaining that the doctrine 
of equitable apportionment superseded state law and hence that any rights 
the company had acquired in conjunction with the 1898 decree were 
necessarily subject to that doctrine.102 The Court then clarified the source of 
law for equitable apportionment in a passage explaining the basis for its 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the Colorado court. Equitable 
apportionment, the Court said, “is a question of ‘federal common law’ upon 
 
98 See id. at 95-99. 
99 Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 466 (1922). 
100 New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1931). 
101 Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 102. 
102 See id. at 108-09 (“As Colorado possessed the right only to an equitable share of the water 
in the stream, the decree of January 12, 1898, in the Colorado water proceeding did not award to the 
Ditch Company any right greater than the equitable share.”). 
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which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be 
conclusive.”103 Although one could have deduced the federal common law 
status of equitable apportionment from the fact that the Court had not 
previously viewed itself as bound by state statutory enactments in the cases 
it decided under Swift, the reason for reiterating that proposition on the day 
that Erie was handed down is obvious. 
Like many of the cases discussed in this subsection, Hinderlider was an 
occasion for the Court to identify a line of precedent that would continue to 
be good law following Erie. But the character of this case was distinctive. As 
with disputes between states over territorial boundaries (to which the Court 
drew an explicit parallel),104 the occasion for the development of federal 
common law in Hinderlider was framed as a resolution of the competing 
claims of interested states. 
The Court has not yet identified circumstances under which the principle 
that drove the result in Hinderlider would justify the promulgation of 
independent choice-of-law rules for use in the federal courts. But it has 
recognized the connection between the two doctrines and repeatedly left the 
issue open. Most conspicuously, in D’Oench, Duhme, the Court tied the 
holding of Klaxon to questions of jurisdictional policy. As discussed above, 
D’Oench, Duhme involved a claim on a note held by an FDIC-insured bank. 
The Court ultimately held that this question was governed by a rule of federal 
common law, but the lower federal courts had assumed that state law 
controlled, requiring them to resolve a choice-of-law question.105 The court 
of appeals applied a “general law” of conflicts to find that, as between Illinois 
and Missouri, the status of the note should be governed by Illinois law.106 
Shortly after this ruling the Supreme Court decided Klaxon, and the potential 
conflict with the circuit court’s treatment of the choice-of-law issue in 
D’Oench, Duhme prompted the Court to grant certiorari in that case.107 
Because the Court found that the status of the note must be governed by 
a federal regulatory rule, it did not decide the choice-of-law question. In 
 
103 Id. at 110. Interestingly, there was some doubt at the time as to whether the interpretation 
of the interstate compact itself would have been governed by federal law. See id. at 110 n.12 (“The 
decisions [of this Court] are not uniform as to whether the interpretation of an interstate compact 
presents a federal question.” (citations omitted)). 
104 See id. (“Jurisdiction over controversies concerning rights in interstate streams is not different 
from those concerning boundaries. These have been recognized as presenting federal questions.”). 
105 Jurisdiction came from the Federal Reserve Act, which conferred power on the FDIC to 
“sue or be sued in any court of law or equity, State or Federal,” a provision that was treated as an 
independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction. D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 
455 (1942) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 264(j)). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 455 (“We granted the petition for certiorari . . . because of the asserted conflict 
between the decision below and [Klaxon].” (citations omitted)). 
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reserving that question, however, the Court tied its recent holding in Klaxon 
to the policies underlying the generic diversity provision. 
We held in [Klaxon] that a failure of a federal court in a diversity of 
citizenship case to follow the forum’s conflict of laws rules “would do violence 
to the principle of uniformity within a state” upon which [Erie] was based. 
The jurisdiction of the District Court in this case, however, is not based on 
diversity of citizenship. Respondent, a federal corporation, brings this suit 
under [the Federal Reserve Act, quoted above]. Whether the rule of the Klaxon 
case applies where federal jurisdiction is not based on diversity of citizenship, 
we need not decide. For we are of the view that the liability of petitioner on 
the note involves decision of a federal not a state question . . . .108 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter went a half step further, 
drawing the connection between the choice-of-law question and the federal 
role in resolving disputes between competing, interested states that the Court 
had recognized in Hinderlider. Frankfurter was not convinced that it was 
necessary to articulate a federal regulatory rule in the case, since he believed 
that the result would be the same no matter the source of law.109 Expanding 
upon that view, Frankfurter acknowledged the argument that Klaxon had no 
application where the clash of state interests arose outside the influence of 
traditional diversity policy, using Guaranty Trust and Hinderlider to frame the 
distinction: 
There is no federal statute to override either the Missouri law as to estoppel 
or the Illinois law which treats respondent as a holder in due course [both of 
which would result in judgment in favor of the FDIC]. Were this Court, in 
the absence of federal legislation, to make its own choice of law, compare 
[Guaranty Trust] and [Hinderlider], decided the same day as [Erie], Illinois or 
Missouri law would furnish the governing principles.110 
Frankfurter ends this passage by citing to a series of early post-Erie cases, 
including Jackson County, in which the Court had found that federal law was 
controlling but incorporated state law by reference to provide the governing 
standard.111 For Justice Frankfurter, in other words, the proposition that a 
federal court operating outside the policies of the general diversity statute 
might develop independent choice-of-law rules was a direct extension of 
federal rulings that referee the competing policies of interested states 
 
108 Id. at 455-56 (citations omitted). 
109 See id. at 462 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Whether the case is governed by the law of one state 
or the other, or by ‘federal common law’ drawn here from one state or the other, the result is the same.”). 
110 Id. at 463-64. 
111 See id. at 464 (citing, inter alia, Jackson County, Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 
313 U.S. 289 (1941)). 
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(Hinderlider) and absorb state law as a matter of federal common law to reduce 
intersystem friction (Jackson County). The implication—a step beyond what 
Frankfurter wrote—is that each may play a role when the policies of the 
general diversity statute do not control. 
Four years later, in a remarkable passage in Vanston Bondholders Protective 
Committee v. Green,112 the Court explored the relationship between choice of 
law and federal jurisdictional policy even more explicitly. The appeal in 
Vanston Bondholders arose from a bankruptcy proceeding. The bankrupt entity, 
Inland Gas, had defaulted on a mortgage bond. The holder of the bond 
demanded payment of the principal, interest on the principal, and interest on 
the unpaid interest. At issue in the case was whether the court should order 
payment of interest on interest, particularly when doing so would leave other 
creditors unpaid. The lower federal courts believed that Erie required them 
to answer this question with reference to state law, which meant either 
Kentucky or New York law. The court of appeals noted that the question 
whether Klaxon controlled in a case not governed by the general diversity 
statute remained open and it looked to Kentucky precedents and to some of 
the Supreme Court’s pre-Erie cases on choice of law in conducting its analysis, 
concluding that both called for the application of New York law, which would 
invalidate the payment.113 
The Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds. The Court 
acknowledged the proposition that the validity and enforceability of 
creditors’ claims against a bankrupt entity must be measured against state law 
in the absence of a federal rule. “In determining what claims are allowable 
and how a debtor’s assets shall be distributed,” however, the Court held that 
“a bankruptcy court does not apply the law of the state where it sits.”114 The 
holding in Erie was an expression of the jurisdictional policy associated with 
the general diversity statute, the Court explained, and had no application in 
bankruptcy.115 In the Bankruptcy Act, Congress granted federal courts the 
authority “to determine how and what claims shall be allowable on equitable 
principles.”116 The Court went on to reaffirm several pre-Erie precedents and 
held that the payment of interest on interest would not be equitable in this 
case. 
 
112 Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946). 
113 See In re Am. Fuel & Power Co., 151 F.2d 470, 475-79 (6th Cir. 1945) (reviewing past 
opinions and concluding that “[t]he most that has been developed from such investigation is conflict. 
We have found no guidance to decision save in the opinions of the highest court of New York.”), 
aff ’d on other grounds, 329 U.S. 156 (1946). The Supreme Court gives a somewhat oversimplified 
account of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning. See Vanston Bondholders, 329 U.S. at 160-61 (discussing the 
circuit court’s holding). 
114 Vanston Bondholders, 329 U.S. at 162. 
115 Id. at 162-63. 
116 Id. 
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This holding rendered it unnecessary for the Court to address the lower 
court’s application of Klaxon to the proceedings. But the Court addressed the 
issue nonetheless in an extended passage worth reproducing in its entirety: 
What claims of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations against the 
bankrupt at the time a petition in bankruptcy is filed, is a question which, in 
the absence of overruling federal law, is to be determined by reference to state 
law. But obligations, such as the one here for interest, often have significant 
contacts in many states, so that the question of which particular state’s law 
should measure the obligation seldom lends itself to simple solution. In 
determining which contact is the most significant in a particular transaction, 
courts can seldom find a complete solution in the mechanical formulae of the 
conflicts of law. Determination requires the exercise of an informed judgment 
in the balancing of all the interests of the state with the most significant 
contacts in order best to accommodate the equities among the parties to the 
policies of those states. Certainly the part of this transaction which touched 
New York, namely, that the indenture contract was written, signed, and 
payable there, may be a reason why that state’s law should govern. But 
apparently the bonds were sold to people all over the nation. And Kentucky’s 
interest in having its own laws govern the obligation cannot be minimized. 
For the property mortgaged was there; the company’s business was chiefly 
there; its products were widely distributed there; and the prices paid by 
Kentuckians for those products would depend, at least to some extent, on the 
stability of the company as affected by the carrying charges on its debts. But 
we need not decide which, if either, of these two states’ laws govern [sic] the 
creation and subsistence and validity of the obligation for interest on interest 
here involved. For assuming, arguendo, that the obligation for interest on 
interest is valid under the law of New York, Kentucky, and the other states 
having some interest in the indenture transaction, we would still have to 
decide whether allowance of the claim would be compatible with the policy 
of the Bankruptcy Act.117 
There is much to observe about this passage. Framing the problem as a 
dispute among states possessing “significant contacts” that must be 
“balance[d] . . . in order best to accommodate the equities among the parties 
to the policies of those states” represents a categorical departure from the 
jurisdiction–selecting rules of the vested rights approach to choice of law that 
predominated in Kentucky, and in every other state at this time. In this 
respect, the Court appears to have taken up the suggestion of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, which urged the Court to disregard the conflicts 
rules of Kentucky and instead adopt an alternative rule of reference under 
 
117 Id. at 161-62 (footnote and citations omitted). 
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which the claim would be allowed so long as “the covenant would . . . be 
upheld in the courts of any State ‘having a substantial relationship to the 
transaction.’”118 Despite the formal separation that the Court drew between 
the enforceability of the covenant under state law and the federal rule that 
governs the distribution of assets in bankruptcy, its discussion of the choice-
of-law question as involving a balance of the equities among the parties in 
light of the policies of the interested states appears to have been influenced 
strongly by the purposes animating the Bankruptcy Act itself. 
In a separate concurrence, Justice Frankfurter chastised the majority for 
declaiming so broadly on the choice-of-law issues and succumbing to the 
“beguiling tendency” of conflicts “problems . . . to be made even more 
complicated than they are.”119 He provided a characteristically clear and 
precise account of the relationship between federal rules of claim 
administration in bankruptcy and the enforceability of underlying obligations 
under state law. As to choice of law, he limited his discussion to a few short 
sentences, indicating that the Court need not have reviewed the decision of 
the Sixth Circuit on that question in resolving the dispute.120 Even so, in the 
brief passage in which he speaks to the issue, Justice Frankfurter, too, 
disregards the choice-of-law rules of Kentucky altogether in identifying the law of 
the state that would govern the enforceability of the disputed covenant.121 
 
118 Id. at 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing the briefs of the SEC). 
119 Id. at 169. 
120 Id. at 172. 
121 Frankfurter’s approach to the question may have been influenced by what appears to be an 
aggressive view about the constitutional limits on the ability of any state other than New York to 
apply its laws to the question: 
The covenant for interest on interest was entered into by the parties in New York. The 
dominant place of performance was also New York. In the circumstances, if the words 
of the indenture created an obligation, they did so only if the law of New York says 
they did. Williston, Contracts § 1792. If New York outlawed such a covenant neither 
Kentucky nor Delaware nor the States in which the bonds were sold or where 
bondholders reside could give effect to an obligation which never came into being. 
Compare John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178. 
Id. at 171. 
In Yates, the Court (per Justice Brandeis) had held that Georgia violated the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause when it applied Georgia law to deny enforcement to a contract made and enforceable 
in New York, even though the complaining party had relocated to Georgia, because most of the 
relevant events at the time of contracting were centered in New York (and none were centered in 
Georgia). See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 183 (1936) (holding that “faith 
and credit must be given to its provisions as fully as if the materiality of this specific 
misrepresentation . . . had been declared by a judgment of a New York court.”). The Court would 
later cut back significantly on the holding of Yates, essentially limiting that case to the proposition 
that a post-occurrence change of residence, without more, cannot support the application of the law 
of the new residence. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 310-11 (1981) (plurality opinion) 
(holding that Yates did not govern the Court’s decision in Allstate). Even at the time, however, 
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Vanston Bondholders, D’Oench, Duhme and the other cases discussed in this 
subsection did not set forth controlling principles for the resolution of 
choice-of-law disputes in suits governed by a jurisdictional policy other than that 
embodied in the general diversity statute. But those cases do make one thing clear. 
Ten years after the Court’s decision in Erie, the issue remained wide open. 
C. Federal Common Law and Klaxon 
When Klaxon is considered in the light of the rulings issued during the 
decade following Erie, a picture emerges of a decision with more limited scope 
and more discrete purposes than the received account of the ruling suggests. 
There is no reason to think that the Court intended Klaxon to be the final word 
on the role of federal courts in the promulgation of choice-of-law rules. 
The dispute in Klaxon involved a question of characterization. The parties 
had entered into a contract for the sale of a business in which the purchasing 
party agreed to use best efforts “to further the manufacture and sale of certain 
patented devices.”122 Things did not go well, the disappointed party sued in 
Delaware federal court, and the jury returned a verdict of $100,000. The 
plaintiff then sought an award of interest on the judgment and the question 
arose whether the availability of interest should be governed by the law of 
Delaware (the forum) or the law of New York (which had controlled the rights 
of the parties under the contract). A characterization of the issue as 
“procedural” would lead to the application of Delaware law; “substantive” 
would mean New York. The lower courts applied general conflicts principles 
to the question rather than looking to Delaware choice of law and found that 
New York law applied. 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions that the 
lower courts determine what law Delaware state courts would apply. The 
entirety of its analysis explaining that ruling is contained in the following 
paragraph: 
We are of opinion that the prohibition declared in [Erie], against such 
independent determinations by the federal courts extends to the field of 
conflict of laws. The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court 
in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts. 
Otherwise the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb 
equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting 
side by side. Any other ruling would do violence to the principle of 
uniformity within a state upon which the Tompkins decision is based. 
 
Justice Frankfurter’s citation to Yates was an aggressive one, since the transaction in Vanston 
Bondholders had a strong contemporaneous nexus to Kentucky. 
122 Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487, 494 (1941). 
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Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in 
different states is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a state, 
within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local 
policies diverging from those of its neighbors. It is not for the federal courts 
to thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent “general law” of 
conflict of laws. Subject only to review by this Court on any federal question 
that may arise, Delaware is free to determine whether a given matter is to be 
governed by the law of the forum or some other law. This Court’s views are 
not the decisive factor in determining the applicable conflicts rule. And the 
proper function of the Delaware federal court is to ascertain what the state 
law is, not what it ought to be.123 
In a footnote, the Court noted with approval a recent decision by the 
First Circuit, Sampson v. Channell, which had reached the same conclusion.124 
This was the Court’s first extended statement on choice of law following 
Erie and one of its primary tasks was to foreclose a potential avenue by which 
lower federal courts might circumvent Erie’s core holding by continuing to 
employ independent judgment in an area of law where the line between 
liability rules and the independent prerogatives of the forum could be difficult 
to define. The Court’s contemporaneous rulings on the equity powers of the 
federal courts provide a useful point of comparison in this regard. 
In Ruhlin, Russell and Guaranty Trust, the Court grappled in stages with 
the status of federal equity practice following Erie. Within weeks of the 
decision in Erie, Ruhlin issued the broad and unqualified pronouncement that 
suits in equity, like suits at common law, were controlled by Erie as a matter 
of “power” and hence must be governed by state law.125 This ruling parallels 
the first line of the Court’s analysis in Klaxon, where the Court held that the 
core Erie ruling applies to choice of law as a categorical matter. The quasi-
substantive nature of equity practice had threatened to act as an invitation for 
federal courts to continue shaping the primary rights and duties of litigants 
according to general law principles even following Erie, a possibility that the 
Ruhlin Court acted quickly to prevent. Just so in Klaxon, where the Court 
eliminates any doubt as to whether Erie applies to conflicts questions at all. 
In Russell v. Todd, decided two years after Ruhlin, the danger of 
circumventing state liability rules was not present—the rights and duties of 
 
123 Id. at 496-97 (footnote and citations omitted). 
124 Id. at 496 n.2 (citing Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 759-62 (1st Cir. 1940)). Sampson 
was a fractured opinion, with the author of the lead opinion writing only for himself, a second 
member of the panel concurring only in the result, and the third dissenting. 
125 See Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 205 (1938) (noting that “[t]he decision in 
[Erie] . . . settles the question of power. The subject is now to be governed, even in the absence of 
state statute, by the decisions of the appropriate state court.”). 
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the parties were defined by federal statute, and federal jurisdiction did not 
depend on the general diversity statute. The Russell Court took that occasion 
to reassert the independent remedial prerogatives of the federal courts, 
pronouncing that the Rules of Decision Act as it then existed did “not apply 
to suits in equity”126 and hence that the timeliness of an equity proceeding 
would be assessed under the federal doctrine of laches.127 “The test of the 
inadequacy of the legal remedy prerequisite to resort to a federal court of 
equity is the legal remedy which federal rather than state courts afford,” the 
Court said, and “the jurisdiction of federal courts of equity, as determined by 
that test, is neither enlarged nor diminished by the names given to remedies 
or the distinction made between them by state practice.”128 Although the 
Court went on to hold that the laches doctrine should often look to state law 
as a point of reference when determining the timeliness of a request for a 
federal equitable remedy, it made a point of framing that proposition as a 
matter of federal remedial policy.129 It took five more years for the Court in 
Guaranty Trust to disaggregate and state clearly the elements of this question 
that it had been conflating in earlier rulings: (1) the source of the law that 
provides the governing liability or regulatory rule in an equity proceeding; 
(2) the power of the federal courts to promulgate independent judge-made 
rules on remedial and procedural matters; and (3) the role that jurisdictional 
policy plays in striking a balance between federal and state prerogatives. 
Guaranty Trust provided the coherent guidance for the proper role of federal 
equity practice in different types of cases that had been lacking. The movement 
from Ruhlin to Russell to Guaranty Trust marked a passage from broad 
pronouncement to qualification and retrenchment to fully realized explanation 
on the question of federal equity powers under the Erie doctrine.130 
At the time Klaxon was decided, the Court was, so to speak, still at the 
Ruhlin stage of this progression. The threat that conflicts doctrine posed to 
the core holding of Erie was perhaps not as great as that posed by equity 
practice, since choice of law putatively requires a selection among state 
liability regimes rather than the independent definition of the parties’ rights 
that equity could entail. Still, the characterization of doctrines as “procedural” 
rather than “substantive”—the type of dispute that gave rise to both Klaxon 
 
126 Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287 (1940). 
127 Id. at 289. 
128 Id. at 286. 
129 See id. at 288-91. 
130 Professor Hart draws this connection in a glancing fashion in the article in which he framed 
his critical response to Klaxon. Henry M. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 
54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 512 n.76 (1954) (noting “[t]wo of the most influential, but interestingly 
different, statements of the governing criterion” for eliminating forum shopping in Klaxon and 
Guaranty Trust). 
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and Sampson—gave courts leeway in shaping and defining the rights of 
parties, and the Court clearly wanted to yoke federal diversity courts firmly 
to state policy to prevent mischief in general diversity cases.131 The Klaxon 
Court’s observation about the “lack of uniformity this may produce between 
federal courts in different states” closely tracks the description the Ruhlin 
Court provided three years earlier of the change that Erie would occasion in 
the Court’s certiorari policy.132 And the Klaxon Court’s reference to the 
federal policy of diversity jurisdiction—“the principle of uniformity within a 
state upon which the Tompkins decision is based”—reflects the passage of 
those three years and the gradual incorporation of considerations of 
jurisdictional policy under the general diversity statute into the Court’s 
analysis, as was evident in Russell and Guaranty Trust.133 
Also at play in 1941 was the Supreme Court’s relationship with lower 
courts in scrutinizing choice-of-law determinations. The Court’s involvement 
in choice of law was undergoing a significant change during this period. The 
1930s brought a series of decisions in which the Court defined more aggressive 
constitutional limitations on state choice of law, raising the prospect of a 
significantly increased federal role in supervising state choice-of-law policy. 
Given the timing of the Erie decision, there was the potential for federal 
courts to replace the substantial role they had played in defining choice of law 
under the general common law of Swift with a similar role under a newly 
robust constitutional doctrine. 
By the close of that decade, however, the Court was retreating from any 
such expansion of its role, interpreting the Full Faith and Credit and Due 
Process Clauses with increasing deference to state prerogatives. In Klaxon 
itself, the plaintiff had argued that the application of forum law instead of 
New York law to the question of interest on the judgment would violate full 
 
131 Professor Roosevelt points out that characterization issues, while not uncommon in disputes 
during this period, are an anomalous type of problem in choice of law and that lends itself more 
readily to the kind of formalistic approach that the Court took in Klaxon: 
Klaxon is a decision about the status of choice-of-law rules under Erie, but it features 
the esoteric and somewhat confusing example of substance-procedure 
characterization. Characterization is a persistent problem in choice of law, but it is not 
the main focus. Instead, choice-of-law rules primarily do two things, corresponding to 
the two steps of the model set out earlier. First, choice-of-law rules set the scope of 
state law. They determine who can claim rights under state law—what people, where, 
and in what circumstances. In this function, they are what I call “rules of scope.” 
Second, they resolve conflicts between state laws. They determine which of two 
conflicting rights under different states’ laws will prevail. In this function, they are 
what I call “rules of priority.” 
Roosevelt, infra note 141, at 18. 
132 See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
133 Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
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faith and credit, but the Court rejected the argument out of hand.134 The 
Court’s simple, short and broadly worded ruling in Klaxon was consistent with 
the determination it had apparently made during this period to get the federal 
courts out of the choice-of-law business in mine-run diversity cases.135 
In the decades following Klaxon, the Court has lost sight of the limited 
scope of its 1941 ruling and the careful reservations it made at the time about 
the impact of jurisdictional policy on choice of law in the federal courts, 
instead treating Klaxon as a categorical doctrine admitting of no exceptions. 
In Day & Zimmerman v. Challoner, for example, the Court reviewed a ruling 
of the Fifth Circuit that had grappled with the choice of applicable law in a 
diversity case between American citizens arising out of an injury suffered in 
Cambodia while U.S. military forces were engaged in armed combat with 
North Vietnam.136 Declining to recognize the potential impact of federal 
interests and international law on a dispute of this character, the Court 
summarily reversed in a per curiam opinion without hearing argument, 
finding that its holding in Klaxon applied “by parity of reasoning” because 
this was “a diversity case” and no further analysis was required.137 This 
desuetude has occurred in the name of federalism, but it is a misplaced and 
unthinking species of federalism that has failed to give proper voice to 
significant federal interests. 
 
134 See id. at 497-98 (“Nothing in the Constitution ensures unlimited extraterritorial 
recognition of all statutes or of any statute under all circumstances”). 
135 On the same day that it issued its decision in Klaxon, the Court also handed down 
Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941), a life insurance dispute in which the insurance company 
initiated a federal interpleader proceeding to determine which among several competing claimants 
were entitled to payment. As the case came before the Court, the remaining dispute involved the 
estate and one claimant, and the resolution of the dispute depended on whether the law of New York 
or Texas would govern. With no attention to the role of the interpleader statute in defining the 
jurisdictional policies that govern such a proceeding, the Court treated the dispute as a simple 
“diversity of citizenship case[]” and applied its sibling ruling in Klaxon without further analysis. 
McCoach, 313 U.S. at 503. 
McCoach has long been criticized by Conflicts scholars for treating the interpleader proceeding 
before it as indistinguishable from a generic diversity action. The interpleader statute includes a 
targeted grant of jurisdiction that embodies policies distinct from those in the general diversity 
statute. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide 
Class Action, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2063-66 (2008) (analyzing the jurisdictional policies of the 
interpleader statute). An extended critique of McCoach will have to wait for future work, but the 
interpleader statute is a strong candidate for the mode of analysis I develop here. 
136 Day & Zimmerman v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per curiam), reversing Challoner 
v. Day & Zimmerman, 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975). I thank Steve Burbank for bringing this 
case to my attention. 
137 Id. at 4. 
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II. CHOICE OF LAW AND KLAXON TODAY 
With the enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act and the expanded 
use of the MDL statute, the federal courts must reengage. CAFA rejects the 
policy of federal jurisdiction bound up in the general diversity statute, 
replacing it with an invitation to litigants to shop for a federal forum in order 
to obtain a different result in service of targeted federal goals.138 The 
jurisdictional policy of the general diversity statute does not control in such 
cases, and neither does the holding of Klaxon. Klaxon and Erie do still stand 
for the proposition that state law must define the primary rights, duties and 
obligations of the parties in this class of cases. That element of the Erie 
doctrine reflects limitations on the power of the federal courts that have 
constitutional foundations. But Klaxon does not foreclose the development of 
a federal rule of decision in resolving conflicts between the local policies of 
interested states. Such conflicts present a question of interstate relations that 
is particularly appropriate for federal resolution. Hinderlider, 
Vanston Bondholders, and D’Oench, Duhme together invite a fresh examination 
of the proper role of independent federal choice-of-law standards under the 
new jurisdictional regime of the federal class action. 
Professor Linda Silberman has done some of the leading work mapping 
the significance of choice of law for aggregate litigation and the impact that 
choice-of-law rules can have in either facilitating or limiting class 
certification.139 She makes a case for uniform federal choice-of-law rules in 
disputes that come into federal court via the Class Action Fairness Act, 
drawing on the broad purposes of the Act and its goal of defeating 
opportunistic forum shopping.140 Though I do not share all of her conclusions, 
the intellectual history set forth in the previous Part and the methodological 
analysis that follows seek to offer a scaffolding for the type of argument that 
Professor Silberman explores, which will be an increasing focus of attention 
in coming years. 
 
138 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act in Historical Context, 156 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1439, 1528 (2008) (“With eyes not blinded by fictions, the reason for federal subject matter 
jurisdiction in such a case might seem to be a desire to give the corporate defendants a choice to 
seek, not a neutral forum, but a more favorable forum.”); Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the 
Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924 (2006) (examining 
the shift in jurisdictional policy that CAFA entails). 
139 See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001 (2008). 
140 See generally Linda J. Silberman, Choice of Law in National Class Actions: 
Should CAFA Make a Difference?, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 54 (2009). 
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A. Choice of Law and Federal Common Law in the Modern Era 
The general methodology for analyzing choice of law in light of changing 
federal jurisdictional policies begins with a more careful account of the 
Court’s ruling in Erie. That ruling operates in two distinct modes. It expresses 
principles of federalism and the separation powers that limit the power of 
federal courts to create substantive law, and it articulates a policy of federal 
jurisdiction that governs what powers federal diversity courts retain in their 
capacity as an independent judicial system and when they should employ 
those powers. These concepts map onto a core structural feature of choice of 
law: the distinction between the geographic scope of state law, which is a 
matter of substantive state policy, and the method of resolving conflicts when 
the laws of more than one state extend their geographic reach to cover a given 
dispute, which is a question of interstate relations. The interstate relations 
question—the resolution of conflicts among interested states—is a federal 
issue. The Klaxon Court concluded that it should incorporate a state rule of 
decision to answer that question in order to satisfy the jurisdictional policies 
of the general diversity statute. But the issue is federal in character. 
The distinction between state substantive policy and interstate relations 
in choice-of-law analysis was coming more sharply into focus in the years 
surrounding Klaxon. During the 1930s, the Court reframed the constitutional 
limits on state choice of law around governmental interests and the avoidance 
of unfair surprise to litigants. The new paradigm marked a major shift away 
from decades of prior case law in which the Court had described 
constitutional limits on state choice of law as a product of the inherent limits 
on a state’s ability to exercise legislative power outside its territorial 
boundaries. That earlier doctrine also informed Pennoyer v. Neff, which 
described the constitutional limits on state adjudicatory jurisdiction as a 
necessary concomitant to limits on state legislative power, and it became 
entwined with the Court’s early due process rulings on the limits of state 
police power in the period leading up to the Lochner era. 
This shift toward a constitutional doctrine of state interests and fairness 
prefigured the cognate shift in choice of law among the states in the second 
half of the twentieth century. Ideas of state interest and fairness had always 
been present when choice of law was framed in terms of territorial power and 
vested rights. Those concepts had never been developed into a fully realized 
approach to choice-of-law analysis; rather, they occupied a peripheral role, 
serving an explanatory or critiquing function. The constitutional cases 
provided a more fully realized vocabulary for the development of 
comprehensive choice-of-law systems around these values. At the same time, 
they gave states de facto encouragement to adopt approaches to choice of law 
in which the points of reference for selecting the applicable law would 
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harmonize with the points of reference for determining whether the law 
selected was constitutionally permissible. A large majority of states have now 
adopted approaches to choice of law that are framed around state interests 
and fairness, and the few states that hold onto lex loci approaches must do so 
within those constitutional strictures. 
With this reframing of choice of law, a common analytical thread now 
runs through the modern approaches: choice of law distinguishes between the 
geographic scope of a state law and the method for selecting the applicable 
law when two or more states would apply their law to a dispute. In the 
scholarly literature, Professor Kramer has articulated the distinction most 
clearly. He explains that the geographic scope of a law—the physical locations 
where the state intends its law to apply—is an element of the law’s substantive 
content in the same way as the elements specifying the people or entities that 
the law will regulate or the activities it will cover: 
A lawsuit with multistate contacts is still just a lawsuit: the plaintiff still alleges 
that because something happened, he is entitled to a remedy; the court must still 
determine whether the facts alleged are true, and whether, if these facts are true, 
some rule of positive law confers a right to recover. Making this determination is 
still a problem of interpretation. The only difference is that some of the facts are 
connected to different states, and the court must determine if that affects whether 
the law or laws at issue confer a right. While this determination may be difficult, 
it does not alter the nature of the problem confronting the court, which remains 
to decide what rights are conferred by positive law.141 
The method for resolving conflicts, in contrast, involves a policy of 
interstate relations. When two or more states extend their laws to cover a 
dispute—when the laws of multiple states overlap in geographic scope as well 
as subject matter—then there is a clash of authority within our federal system. 
The resolution of that clash implicates the administration of power among 
states. Left to their own devices, of course, states come up with ways of 
resolving those disputes. When they do, they are making interstate relations 
law in the absence of federal direction.142 
 
141 Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 290 (1990). Professor Kim 
Roosevelt, who serves as the Reporter for the ALI Project on the Third Restatement of the Conflict 
of Laws, has long embraced this account of choice of law and has provided an account of Erie and 
the Klaxon doctrine that is broadly in line with the analysis that follows. See generally 
Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie to Klaxon to CAFA and Shady Grove, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
142 My approach here is consistent with that developed by Professor Roosevelt. See 
Roosevelt, supra note 141, at 16-23. Professor Roosevelt gives much greater attention to the 
practical implementation of his approach than I do to mine. As I indicate below, that task 
remains for me in future work. 
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These distinct components of choice of law implicate distinct components 
of the Erie doctrine. The geographic scope of state law is a matter of internal 
state policy and so is the sole prerogative of the states. This is the 
constitutional dimension of Erie, which recognizes the quasi-sovereign status 
of states and their role as authoritative expositors of their own substantive 
policies. The federal government has no power to alter the contents of those 
state policies. Federal law can constrain or displace state law in many ways, 
but it cannot modify the internal content of state law.143 In contrast, the 
interstate relations question of how to resolve a conflict among multiple state 
laws that all purport to govern the same dispute is distinctively federal. It is 
analogous to the resolution of competing state-law claims over the flow of 
interstate rivers that was addressed in Hinderlider—a clash of conflicting state 
interests arising from overlapping extensions of state law. These are questions 
of coordination, aptly described in a passage from another dispute over an 
interstate waterway that the Hinderlider Court embraced. 
New York has the physical power to cut off all the water within its 
jurisdiction. But clearly the exercise of such a power to the destruction of the 
interest of lower States could not be tolerated. And, on the other hand, 
equally little could New Jersey be permitted to require New York to give up 
its power altogether in order that the river might come down to it 
undiminished. Both States have real and substantial interests in the River 
that must be reconciled as best they may.144 
As its first act of clarification in specifying the sources of controlling law 
following Erie, the Hinderlider Court indicated that such questions of 
resolving conflicts among competing exercises of state authority are the 
subject of federal common law. 
When the general diversity statute is the basis for federal jurisdiction, 
Klaxon and Guaranty Trust hold that the federal common-law power to answer 
such questions must be balanced against the policies that are distinctive to 
general diversity: avoidance of results-oriented forum shopping and arbitrary 
differences in outcome between diverse and non-diverse litigants. Klaxon 
answered that balance of policies by incorporating forum-state choice of law 
by reference. As the Court had put the matter two years earlier, “the state law 
has been absorbed, as it were, as the governing federal rule not because state 
law was the source of the right but because recognition of state interests was 
 
143 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress may not 
commandeer state legislative processes and compel States to enact specific laws). 
144 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 103 (1938) (quoting 
New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342-43 (1931)). 
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not deemed inconsistent with federal policy.”145 In the case of Klaxon, the 
Court found the absorption of state law to be mandated by the policies of the 
general diversity statute. 
In the seventy-five years since Klaxon, the interstate judicial system has 
produced reasons to question the wisdom of that answer in general diversity 
cases.146 The proliferation of approaches to choice of law and the preference 
that many courts exhibit for the law of the forum produced rampant 
horizontal forum shopping that a uniform approach to choice of law in federal 
diversity courts might have diminished, though the Court’s radical reform of 
general jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. Bauman147 may now mitigate that 
problem significantly.148 But whatever its wisdom, Klaxon’s answer was always 
driven by jurisdictional policy. 
Now that Congress has enacted a substantially different policy of federal 
jurisdiction in CAFA, it becomes necessary to revisit the interstate relations 
question in choice of law. D’Oench, Duhme indicated as much shortly after 
Klaxon was decided, and Vanston Bondholders framed the appropriate mode of 
analysis. Vanston Bondholders distinguished between the nature and validity of 
competing claims in a bankruptcy proceeding (analogous to determining 
questions of geographic scope in a choice-of-law dispute) and the resolution 
of conflicting claims of equitable priority (analogous to resolving a conflict 
among competing state laws).149 The former had to be controlled by state law. 
 
145 Bd. of Comm’rs of Jackson Cty. v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1939) (citing Brown 
v. United States, 263 U.S. 78 (1923)). 
146 Major figures in the fields of conflicts and federal courts began framing the standard 
critiques in the middle part of the twentieth century. Professor Hart questioned the content of 
the federal policy that would demand strict adherence to state choice of law in federal diversity 
cases. Hart, supra note 130, at 514 n.86 (“It is difficult to understand what federal policy required, 
in Klaxon, the denial to a New York plaintiff forced to bring suit in Delaware of interest on a 
verdict which the New York and perhaps other state courts would have allowed, merely because 
Delaware state courts would not have allowed it.”). Professor Baxter staked out an aggressive 
position that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its implementing legislation ex proprio vigore 
called for a uniform approach to choice of law that would control in federal courts and state courts 
alike. William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1963) 
(“At least after Erie, the full-faith-and-credit clause should have been interpreted to dictate the 
initial choice-of-law reference in every case, whether in a state or federal court.”). 
147 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760-61 (2014) (rejecting the “doing-business” 
standard of general jurisdiction and adopting a more restrictive approach that measures a corporate 
defendant’s relative contacts in each state and permits general jurisdiction only where the 
corporation is most “at home”—a standard typically met only where the defendant is incorporated 
or has its principal place of business). 
148 See generally Linda J. Silberman, The End of Another Era: Reflections on Daimler and its 
Implications for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 675 (2015). 
149 The relevant passage from Vanston Bondholders reads: 
What claims of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations against the bankrupt at 
the time a petition in bankruptcy is filed is a question which, in the absence of 
overruling federal law, is to be determined by reference to state law . . . . In 
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The latter was governed not by state choice of law but by the distinctive 
policies of the controlling federal bankruptcy statute. As the next Section 
explains, the Class Action Fairness Act calls for a similar analysis. 
B. Jurisdictional Policy and the Class Action Fairness Act 
CAFA substantially expands the scope of diversity jurisdiction over class 
actions and similar proceedings. The statute authorizes jurisdiction based on 
an aggregate amount in controversy of five million dollars and minimal 
diversity (subject to narrow exceptions) while eliminating barriers to removal 
so that class actions filed in state court can more readily be brought to federal 
court.150 It is the largest targeted expansion of diversity that Congress has 
enacted, and the change in statutory text carries with it a shift in jurisdictional 
policy that departs significantly from the general diversity statute. 
Case law describing the jurisdictional policy of the general diversity 
statute has always rested on spare textual foundations. The diversity clause in 
Article III was not the subject of any recorded discussion in the 
Constitutional Convention151 and much of the criticism of the clause during 
the ratification debates involved a fear that never materialized: the 
assumption that the subject-matter jurisdiction of state courts and federal 
courts would be mutually exclusive rather than concurrent.152 The proposition 
that diversity was necessary to protect out-of-state litigants from bias in state 
courts emerged as a post-hoc explanation153 and has translated to only a few 
 
determining what claims are allowable and how a debtor’s assets shall be distributed, 
a bankruptcy court does not apply the state where it sits. Erie . . . has no such 
implication. 
329 U.S. 156, 162 (footnote and citations omitted). 
150 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453 (2012). 
151 See Friendly, supra note 15, at 484-87 (describing the limited nature of the record of debate 
over diversity jurisdiction in the Constitutional Convention). 
152 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasizing that state courts would 
retain concurrent jurisdiction over cases that fell within the diversity grant of Article III); Friendly, 
supra note 15, at 487-504 (surveying debates over the federal courts in state conventions).  
153 Chief Justice Marshall’s classic statement, characterizing diversity jurisdiction as a response 
to “apprehensions” about local bias that the Constitution “indulges,” appears in the opinion by which 
the Court opened the doors of diversity to corporate litigants through a judicially crafted fiction 
about the putative citizenship of shareholders. 
A constitution, from its nature, deals in generals, not in detail. Its framers cannot 
perceive minute distinctions which arise in the progress of the nation, and therefore 
confine it to the establishment of broad and general principles. 
The judicial department was introduced into the American constitution under 
impressions, and with views, which are too apparent not to be perceived by all. 
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice 
as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is not less true 
that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views 
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minor elements of the statutory framework over the years.154 Rather, as 
Professor Purcell has explained, diversity policy has always been a judicial 
creation with the occasional congressional ratification or adjustment coming 
long after the course was set.155 A statute that implements a major shift in 
diversity doctrine is thus a significant event, and the changes in statutory text 
require a close examination of concomitant changes in underlying policy.156 
The Class Action Fairness Act instructs federal courts to employ its targeted 
grant of jurisdiction to protect defendants against abusive state-court 
litigation, protect the interests of class members, safeguard national economic 
interests, and prevent excesses of state power.157 The statute has the purpose 
 
with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has 
established national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a 
citizen, or between citizens of different states. 
Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (6 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); see also EDWARD PURCELL, 
LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL 
AMERICA, 1870-1958 127-47 (1992) (describing the significance of Deveaux in the early 
development of corporate diversity litigation); Friendly, supra note 15 (discussing this passage 
in conjunction with the popular opposition to diversity during the ratification debates). 
154 These are the terms prohibiting removal based on diversity by in-state defendants: 28 
U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2012), which does not apply under the Class Action Fairness Act; 28 U.S.C. 
§1332(d), a former term limiting diversity jurisdiction to cases involving an in-state party (which 
was included in section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 but removed not long thereafter). See Judiciary 
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (“[T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance, 
concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or equity, 
where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum of five hundred dollars, . . . [and] 
the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State.”). 
Another former term required parties to show actual bias before removing based on diversity, which 
Congress enacted in 1866, see Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 196, 14 Stat. 558, 558-59, but later eliminated 
when it proved too difficult to administer. See also Whitney R. Harris, Survey of the Federal Judicial 
Code—The 1948 Revision and First Interpretive Decisions, 3 SW. L.J. 229, 239-42 (1949) (detailing 
changes to the removal statute in the 1948 amendments to Title 28 including the elimination of 
removal “upon the ground that prejudice or local influence will prevent the defendant from 
obtaining justice in that state court”). 
155 See Purcell, supra note 153 (discussing removal based on diversity jurisdiction). The 
Court recently emphasized the minimal role of the statutory text in setting the policies of the 
federal arising under statute, as well. See Merrill Lynch v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 1570-71 
(2016) (“[T]he test for § 1331 jurisdiction is not grounded in that provision’s particular phrasing 
. . . [and] does not turn on § 1331’s text.”). 
156 See, e.g., Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch, supra note 138, at 1941–44 (noting the 
consequences of CAFA’s impact on jurisdictional policy); Burbank, CAFA in Historical Context, supra 
note 138, at 1525–33 (discussing the fact that federal forums may be more favorable for corporate 
defendants in CAFA cases). 
157 See Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1711 (2012)) (discussing the purposes of the CAFA amendment). See generally Tobias Barrington 
Wolff, Federal Jurisdiction and Due Process in the Era of the Nationwide Class Action, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 2035, 2037-39 (2008) (discussing CAFA’s statements of purpose); id. at 2054-72 
(describing the significance of targeted jurisdictional grants aimed at safeguarding specific 
congressional policies and analyzing the parallels between CAFA’s expansion of federal jurisdiction 
and the doctrine of protective jurisdiction).  
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and expectation that removing class actions from state to federal court will 
produce different results in the adjudication of state-law claims because 
federal courts will employ different certification standards and will apply the 
underlying substantive law more fairly. In other words, CAFA encourages 
results-oriented forum shopping. It marks a fundamental shift away from the 
jurisdictional policy of the Erie doctrine. 
As of this writing, the Court has made just one clear statement about the 
impact of the CAFA on broader questions of jurisdictional policy in cases that 
come into federal court under its provisions. That statement is small and has 
no direct bearing on Erie or choice of law, but it does signal the Court’s 
recognition that CAFA carries with it a distinctive set of purposes. In 
Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens,158 the Court heard an appeal in a 
CAFA case to decide what burden a defendant bears in pleading the amount 
in controversy in a notice of removal. The language of the removal statute 
tracks Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring a “short and 
plain statement of the grounds for removal,”159 a fact that suggests that 
defendant’s statement of the amount in controversy in the notice of removal 
might be governed by the same “plausibility” standard that the Court recently 
adopted for pleading claims. However, the Tenth Circuit and many other 
lower federal courts apply a “presumption against removal” in the 
administration of the removal statute, and that jurisdictional policy led some 
courts (including the district court in Dart Cherokee) to conclude that removal 
required an even more demanding standard than “plausibility” when 
defendant alleges the prerequisites for jurisdiction. The Court rejected that 
argument, concluding that the parallel between § 1446(a) and Rule 8 was 
deliberate and indicated Congress’s intent to have the same standard apply. 
On the “presumption against removal”—which the Court itself has 
never embraced or rejected—the majority found that such a doctrine 
would not affect the result even if it were assumed to exist in ordinary 
diversity cases. Dart Cherokee was removed to federal court on the basis of 
CAFA jurisdiction, the Court explained, and the specialized diversity 
provisions of CAFA entailed a jurisdictional policy different from that of 
the general diversity statute. 
In remanding the case to state court, the District Court relied, in part, on a 
purported “presumption” against removal. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. See, e.g., 
Laughlin, 50 F.3d, at 873 (“[T]here is a presumption against removal 
jurisdiction.”). We need not here decide whether such a presumption is 
proper in mine-run diversity cases. It suffices to point out that no anti-
 
158 Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014). 
159 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2012). 
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removal presumption attends cases invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted 
to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions in federal court. See Standard 
Fire Ins. Co., 568 U.S., at——, 133 S.Ct., at 1350 (“CAFA’s primary objective” 
is to “ensur[e] ‘Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national 
importance.’ “ (quoting § 2(b)(2), 119 Stat. 5)); S.Rep. No. 109–14, p. 43 
(2005) (CAFA’s “provisions should be read broadly, with a strong preference 
that interstate class actions should be heard in a federal court if properly 
removed by any defendant.”).160 
CAFA applies a distinctive set of jurisdictional policies to cases brought 
into federal court under its provisions—policies that differ from those 
applicable in “mine-run diversity cases.”161 Congress both contemplated and 
intended that litigants would move interstate class actions into federal court 
in order to seek an outcome different from the one they could expect in state 
court. Though Congress did not make federal jurisdiction exclusive and 
deprive state courts of the power to hear national class actions altogether, it 
enacted a jurisdictional provision that judged state courts to be inadequate 
tribunals for the resolution of such disputes because of the results they 
produced. In other words, CAFA encourages results-oriented vertical forum 
shopping. The portions of Erie and its progeny that rest on the policies of the 
general diversity statute do not hold sway in CAFA cases. 
III. INSTITUTIONAL POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The foregoing analysis describes the power of federal courts to craft 
choice-of-law rules for the resolution of state-law conflicts in CAFA cases. 
Congress’s decision to supersede the jurisdictional policy of the general 
diversity statute brings cases governed by CAFA outside the rule of Klaxon. 
 
160 Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. at 554. The Court made a similar statement about CAFA in 
Standard Fire Ins. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013), though in a less conclusive manner. In Knowles, 
a plaintiff attempted to defeat CAFA jurisdiction by filing in state court and stipulating that the 
total amount in controversy would be less than $5,000,000 for the entire class. The Court rejected 
the effort, drawing on earlier rulings involving not-yet-certified classes to hold that a putative class 
representative cannot bind absent class members to a stipulation of fact. See id. at 1349 (“Neither a 
proposed class action nor a rejected class action may bind nonparties.” (citing Smith v. Bayer Corp., 
131 S. Ct. 2368, 2380 (2011)); id. (“[A] nonnamed class member is [not] a party to the class-action 
litigation before the class is certified.” (quoting Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 16 n.1 (2002) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting))). In rejecting the plaintiff ’s attempt to argue around this proposition, the 
Court explained that “[t]o hold otherwise would, for CAFA jurisdictional purposes, treat a 
nonbinding stipulation as if it were binding, exalt form over substance, and run directly counter to 
CAFA’s primary objective: ensuring ‘Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national 
importance.’” Id. at 1350 (citation omitted). The invocation of CAFA’s jurisdictional purposes is 
conspicuous, but here its purpose is to reaffirm a proposition first articulated in non-CAFA class 
litigation, rather than to draw a contrast with potentially applicable doctrine in non-CAFA cases. 
161 Dart Cherokee, 135 S. Ct. at 554. 
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But important questions remain to be resolved. Should federal courts employ 
that power, or should they continue to incorporate state choice of law by 
reference when resolving genuine conflicts in CAFA cases? If federal courts 
do undertake to craft choice-of-law rules in CAFA disputes, what principles 
should guide them in crafting these conflict-resolution rules? A thorough 
examination of these questions must await future work. For now, I offer these 
brief initial observations. 
The constraint that Klaxon imposed was a product of the jurisdictional 
policies of the general diversity statute. The power that federal courts have 
to craft choice of law in CAFA cases is a product of the distinct policies 
embodied in that more targeted grant of jurisdiction. It follows that the 
policies underlying CAFA—a preference for federal certification standards 
and a desire to avoid harm to “class members with legitimate claims and 
defendants that have acted responsibly”—must guide whether and how 
federal courts employ that power.162 Guide need not mean exclusively dictate. 
CAFA is the starting point in asking whether federal courts should employ 
the power to adopt their own methods for resolving conflicts of state law, but 
other federal policies may influence the question. Congress created a 
powerful consolidation tool in the MDL statute, for example, aiming to 
promote efficiency and fairness in pre-trial proceedings when large numbers 
of related cases are filed around the country. Simplification of the choice-of-
law calculus when considering dispositive motions in consolidated MDL 
proceedings could promote those purposes. Determining whether federal 
courts should embrace this new role will require careful attention to the entire 
complex of federal policies surrounding this class of cases. 
The actual task of crafting choice-of-law rules in this class of cases may 
also prove difficult. A federal court must be attentive to the distinction 
between the geographic scope a state gives to its law and the resolution of 
genuine conflicts when more than one state would apply its law to a given 
dispute. The former remains the exclusive province of the states. In some 
instances, states will answer these questions of scope directly—in the text of 
a statute or the construction of its law by appellate decision. But states often 
do not have occasion to address questions of geographic scope, and even when 
they do, they may not distinguish carefully between geographic scope and the 
resolution of genuine conflicts. In a state that uses the First Restatement, for 
example, the jurisdiction–selecting rules may not draw any such distinction, 
requiring a difficult exercise in legal forensics to isolate questions of scope. 
Professor Kramer took a first pass at investigating these questions in his work 
on the subject and his insights will be helpful.163 But the imperative to 
 
162 The Class Action Fairness Act § 2(a)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 5 (2005). 
163 See Kramer, supra note 141. 
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distinguish between geographic scope and the resolution of conflicts will be 
even greater here, since federal courts would only have authority to speak to 
the latter question.164 
CONCLUSION 
Klaxon has provided a simple answer to a complicated question since the 
earliest days of the post-Erie era. That answer has always depended on the 
jurisdictional policies of the general diversity statute. When Congress 
supersedes those policies with a targeted jurisdictional provision in a 
particular class of cases, Klaxon no longer controls. The Class Action Fairness 
Act of 2005 requires the federal courts to return to first principles on choice 
of law and jurisdictional policy. Deciding whether to use the power to craft 
federal choice of law in CAFA cases, and how to use that power if they do, 
are questions that require more thought and study. But the power exists. 
 
164 Professor Roosevelt makes a fine start tackling these difficult questions in one section of 
his article on Erie and choice of law. See Roosevelt, supra note 141, at 40–50. Much more work remains 
to be done in that vein. 
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